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FOREWORD
Since early 2002, U.S. forces have provided training and intelligence support to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) as a component of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The
AFP have been engaged in combat with the Abu Sayyaf, a group
previously known for its brutal, though hardly political, kidnappings.
Though “Abu Sayyaf” is usually proceeded with the words the “al
Qaeda-linked,” there was little tangible evidence of such a link from
the mid-1990s to 2002. From its founding in 1991 by Afghan veteran
Abdurrajak Janjalani through Ramzi Yousef’s Bojinka Plot in 1995,
the links were clear and convincing. However, in 2002, the leaders
of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al Qaeda’s regional afﬁliate responsible
for the bombings of the Sari Nightclub in Bali (October 2002), the
J. W. Marriott Hotel (August 2003), and the Australian Embassy
(September 2004), were reeling from a number of arrests and
setbacks. JI’s leadership ordered their Mindanao-based operatives
to restore ties to the Abu Sayaaf. Since then, the group has waged a
steady and consistent campaign of urban terrorism. Though they are
not the greatest threat to Philippine security, they have the ability to
create economic instability. Their terrorist capabilities have steadily
improved.
The conﬂict against the Abu Sayyaf is complicated by the
ongoing peace process between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), a 10,000-12,000 man strong insurgent force ﬁghting for an
independent Islamic state since 1978, and the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GRP). The MILF had clear ties to al
Qaeda beginning in the late 1980s when they dispatched troops to
Afghanistan for training. Later, the MILF availed itself to al Qaeda
by opening their camps to al Qaeda trainers and members of JI.
Although the MILF deny these ties, they persist to this day. MILF
members provide training and sanctuary to JI members, giving the
terrorist organization resiliency. For the MILF, it is a show of Islamic
solidarity, as well as a hedge, should the peace process fail. But the
Abu Sawaf Group (ASG) has taken advantage of this. Members
have moved into MILF-controlled regions and are trained in MILF
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camps alongside JI members. The MILF uses the ASG when it needs
plausible deniability and cover for its terrorist operations. At some
point, it becomes impossible to clearly distinguish between these
groups: ASG members may perpetrate the terrorist act, often with
the help of MILF or JI members; they were trained in MILF camps
by Indonesian JI instructors. The Philippine government downplays
this triangular relationship, for fear of upsetting the peace process of
the MILF, limiting U.S. policy options. Yet, the mutual relationship
between the groups has given JI a new lease on life, and perpetuated
the terrorist threat to the region.
This monograph provides an in-depth analysis of the ASG and
the triangular relationship between them, the MILF and JI. It seeks
to understand the regional impact that this group’s resurgence will
have on the war on terror in Southeast Asia, and the impact on
America and her allies. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to
offer this monograph as part of the ongoing debate on global and
regional security.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has re-emerged as one of the
more important terrorist groups confronting the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), the United States, and our
allies in Southeast Asia. Founded in 1991 by Abdurrajak Janjalani,
a veteran of the Afghan Mujiheddin and colleague of Osama bin
Laden, the group quickly rose to prominence as a lethal terrorist
organization committed to the establishment of an independent
Islamic state. With funds from Saudi charities administered by
bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, the ASG
grew quickly. The group focused its terrorist, assassination, and
kidnapping efforts on sectarian targets. Yet, following the plot led
by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to blow up 11 U.S.
jetliners and assassinate the Pope, Khalifa’s and the ASG’s roles were
uncovered.
Khalifa was unable to return to the Philippines, and while his
charities remained open, they were unable to support the larger Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the ASG as they had in the past.
The ASG was further weakened by a number of arrests and the death
of their founder in December 1998. The group quickly degenerated
into a number of violent, though hardly political, kidnappers. The
group gained international notoriety in 2000 with high-proﬁle raids
on diving resorts in Palawan and Sipidan, Malaysia, which led to the
deaths of several tourists, including Americans. The 2000 kidnapping
of the Burnhams, along with the group’s previous connections with
al Qaeda, were the the cassus belli for the U.S. military to re-engage
in the Philippines following the September 11, 2001, attacks by al
Qaeda.
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo pledged close
support for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and with that came
considerable military assistance and training, beginning in early
2002. U.S. forces provided training and intelligence support for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, while U.S. naval engineers engaged
in popular civic action campaign in Basilan.
The ASG struck back in October 2002, detonating a bomb that
killed a U.S. Special Forces Ofﬁcer. Since then, it dramatically cut
vii

back on its kidnappings, while at the same time began to engage
in a systematic campaign of terrorism. In February 2004, ASG
operatives blew up a SuperFerry out of Manila, killing 194 people.
On Valentine’s Day, 2005, they executed a triple bombing across
three cities. ASG members have engaged in a number of other attacks
while several others have been disrupted.
Why the shift back to terrorism? This author contends that it was
the conﬂuence of internal and external factors. Internally, there was
a change in leadership within the organization. Abu Sabaya and
Ghalib Andang, the leaders most responsible for the kidnappings,
had been killed and captured, respectively. This allowed Khadaffy
Janjalani, the younger brother of the group’s founder, to consolidate
his leadership and bring the organization back to its roots. The ASG
was also trying to beneﬁt from the ongoing peace process between the
GRP and the MILF. The ASG began to search for hardline members
of the MILF, who were sure to reject an autonomy agreement with
the government.
Other factors were also at work. In 2002, the leaders of al Qaeda’s
regional afﬁliate, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), were reeling from a number
of arrests of operatives that had occurred around the region. That
year they decided to forge closer ties with the ASG and invited them
to begin training with JI within the MILF’s camps in Mindanao. The
ASG readily agreed. While the MILF publicly denies the relationship
with both the ASG and JI, a number of arrests in the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Indonesia of key JI suspects conﬁrms that the training
of JI recruits in Mindanao has continued. Moreover, in a number of
terrorist incidents that have transpired in the past 2 years, it has been
all but impossible to differentiate between the groups: JI members
provide training to MILF and ASG members in MILF camps.
Members of the MILF and ASG engage in joint terrorist operations.
Despite their denials to the contrary, considerable evidence
suggests that the MILF continues to coddle JI and ASG members.
However, as the MILF is currently engaged in a peace process with
the GRP, the Philippine government continues to give them the
beneﬁt of the doubt and has resisted pressure from the United States
to follow a harsher line against them.
The ASG remains of concern for a number of reasons. The ﬁrst is
their willingness to engage in indiscriminant violence against civilian
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targets and the increases in their technical capacity. On two occasions
now, JI blueprints for larger truck bombs have been discovered. The
second is their public call for greater sectarian violence. This is very
much in line with JI’s strategy of fomenting sectarian violence in the
Malukus and Sulawesi, Indonesia, where a fragile peace is holding.
This also ties in with the ASG’s original strategy that they followed
in 1991-95. Third, the ASG has taken advantage of the Balik Islam
(Christian converts to Islam) networks. Converts have played a
role in every major or attempted attack in the past year. The use
of converts has extended JI’s reach beyond Mindanao and the Sulu
archipelago into Luzon and and the Visayas, greatly broadening the
battleﬁeld. Finally, the ASG has been built upon the original charitable
and nongovernment organization (NGO) networks established by
Mohammed Jamal Khalifa that have remained stubbornly resilient
to counterterror operations.
The author warns that, despite the regeneration of the ASG as
a bonaﬁde terrorist organization, the primary security threat that
is confronting the GRP comes from the Communist Party of the
Philippines and their armed wing, the New People’s Army. To
that end, the GRP will focus on the ASG and MILF inasmuch as
they expect it to garner U.S. materiel support and assistance. The
author counsels U.S. Defense Department policymakers regarding
the institutional frailties of the GRP and the institutional corruption
within the Philippine armed forces. While the author suggests that
training continue, he cautions about being drawn into a quagmire.
Despite the MILF’s ties to the ASG and JI, he also suggests that the
United States should continue to support the peace process and try
to wean the MILF off their relationship with terrorist organizations.
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BALIK-TERRORISM:
THE RETURN OF THE ABU SAYYAF
On February 27, 2004, a bomb detonated on SuperFerry 14 after
departing Manila, killing 194 people. Although the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) initially dismissed the claim
of responsibility by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), evidence emerged
that conﬁrmed the group’s immediate claim of responsibility. It was
the second most lethal terrorist attack in Asia after the Bali bombing,
perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) on October 12, 2002, and the
single most deadly terrorist attack in the Philippines. Since then,
Philippine security ofﬁcials arrested several Abu Sayyaf members
in metro-Manila who were in the ﬁnal stages of preparation for
bombings. Between October 2004 and January 2005, there were three
aborted bombings, including a planned attack on the U.S. Embassy.1
On February 14, 2005, the ASG claimed responsibility for three near
simultaneous bombings in Manila, Davao, and General Santos that
left 11 people dead and 136 wounded.2 In May 2005, Philippine
ofﬁcials uncovered a cache of bomb making chemicals in a Manila
warehouse.3
In short, the ASG has reentered the arena of terrorism. Although
the group is thought to have only 200-300 members, Philippine
National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales named the Abu
Sayyaf as the “most dangerous” of all rebel groups in the country.
“Compared with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the New
People’s Army, the Abu Sayyaf is the most dangerous because these
terrorists even volunteer to conduct attacks to win the recognition
of international terrorist groups, including al-Qaida,” Gonzales
said.4 This is hyperbole, directed at the U.S. Government, as the
primary internal security threat remains the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New People’s Army. But the ASG and their ties
to JI have the potential to cause instability and negative economic
impacts.
Why has this brutal kidnap-for-ransom gang reentered the fray
and abandoned its 8-9 year reign of deadly, though hardly political,
kidnappings? What are the endogenous and exogenous factors in
explaining the Abu Sayyaf’s reinvention? What are the implications
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for both Philippine and regional security? This monograph will
provide a brief history of the ASG, before trying to explain the
group’s reorientation and their implications for Philippine and
regional security.
HISTORY
The Founding Years (1988-91).
The origins of the Abu Sayyaf5 (literally “bearer of the sword”),
formally known as Al-Harakatul al-Islamiya, can be traced to
Afghanistan. In the early 1980s, between 300 and 500 Moro
fundamentalists arrived in Peshawar, Pakistan, to serve with the
Mujiheddin ﬁghting the Soviet Afghanistan invasion and occupation.
One of them, Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani, emerged as a leader.
Janjalani was the son of a Basilan ulama and became a ﬁery Islamic
orator himself. He attended an Islamic university in Saudi Arabia,
graduating in 1981 before studying Islamic jurisprudence at Ummu
I-Qura in Mecca for 3 years. He returned to Basilan and Zamboanga
to preach in 1984. In 1987 he traveled to Libya and then continued
on to join the Mujiheddin and fought the Soviets for several years
in Afghanistan. In Peshawar, Janjalani befriended a wealthy Saudi
supporter of the Mujiheddin, Osama bin Laden. Janjalani, and later
his younger brother, Khaddafy Janjalani, received training in the late
1980s and early 1990s at a training camp near Khost, Afghanistan,
that was run by a professor of Islam, Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, whose
belief in the strict Wahhabi interpretation of Islam found him favor
with many wealthy Saudis, including Osama bin Laden. Abdur Rab
Rasul Sayaf was also the mentor of an Indonesian jihadi, Riduan
Isamudin, better known as Hambali. There is some evidence that the
elder Janjalani was a member of the 48-person Executive Council of
the Islamic International Brigade, the nucleus of what would become
the al Qaeda organization.6
In 1989, Abdurajak Janjalani vowed to pursue “jihad qital”—armed
struggle—to create a pure Islamic state in the southern Philippines
based on Salaﬁ Wahhabism. Following the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan in 1989, Janjalani traveled between his home in Basilan
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and the Peshawar-Afghan border region to recruit supporters. Ten
leading Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)7 ofﬁcials, who felt
sidelined or disagreed with Nur Misuari, joined Janjalani, including
Ustadz Wahab Akbar, Amilhussin Jumaani, and Abdul Ashmad.
Philippine intelligence ofﬁcials believe that the ASG’s primary goal
at the time was to sabotage the ongoing peace process between the
MNLF and the GRP and to discredit the MNLF’s leaders.8 When
Osama bin Laden wanted to expand his al Qaeda network, established
in 1988, he turned to Janjalani to establish a cell in Southeast Asia.9
This cell also would be an important base of support for terrorist
operations. Despite ties between al Qaeda and the MILF, in the early1990s they were nascent and, moreover, the MILF indicated little
interest in conducting or assisting terrorist operations. It was not
until 1999-2000, when the MILF experienced signiﬁcant battleﬁeld
losses, that it founded its Special Operations Group (MILF-SOG)
and began to engage in terrorism; before this it remained focused on
waging conventional guerrilla warfare.
Philippine National Police (PNP) intelligence documents suggest
that the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi
Yousef, strongly encouraged the formation of the ASG to serve as
his contact and support group in the Philippines. Yousef, who was
teaching bomb making at the Khost camp, traveled with Janjalani
to the Philippines from December 1991 to May 1992 at bin Laden’s
request, where he trained ASG members in bomb making in their
camp on Basilan Island.10 When Yousef was introduced to Janjalani’s
assistant and a leader of the Abu Sayyaf, Edwin Angeles,11 it was
as an “emissary from bin Laden,” and he was referred to as “the
Chemist,” owing to his proﬁciency in bomb making. Yousef spent
a short period of time on Basilan, where he trained approximately
20 Abu Sayyaf militants in the art of bomb making. Though he left
the Philippines, Yousef returned in 1994 following the February 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City.
In addition to providing funding to Janjalani, bin Laden also
provided expertise to the new organization. Wali Khan Amin Shah,
who fought alongside bin Laden in Afghanistan and who was a close
personal friend, was dispatched to recruit, organize, and assist the
Abu Sayyaf. Funds from al Qaeda also began to ﬂow, and the ASG
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began to receive large deliveries of weapons—mainly Libyan
models—from Victor Blout, the Tajik arms dealer who was later
linked to both the Taliban regime and al Qaeda.12
Anti-Christian/Islamic State Terrorism (1991-95).
The ASG organization quickly made its mark, establishing a
reputation and seen as a small but lethal organization. Abu Sayyaf
began its terrorist attacks in the Philippines in 1991. Most of their
attacks at this time were directed at Christian churches, missionaries,
and non-Muslim communities.13 These attacks include the 1991
grenade attack in Zamboanga city that killed two American
evangelists; the bombing of the Christian missionary ship, M/V
Doulosin Zamboanga, in August 1991; the killing of an Italian priest
in Zamboanga on May 20, 1992; the August 10, 1992, bombing of
a building in Zamboanga that killed 2 and wounded 40 staffers of
a Christian missionary ship; the kidnapping of two Spanish nuns
in Sulu on January 17, 1993; the kidnapping of a Spanish priest on
March 18, 1993; the kidnapping of an American missionary on Sulu
on November 14, 1993; and, the December 26, 1993, bombing of
a cathedral in Davao that killed 6 and wounded 132. On June 10,
1994, a series of bombs in Zamboanga, attributed by the AFP to the
ASG, killed over 71 people. In one of the most brutal, grisly, and
publicly remembered and reviled attacks in modern Philippine
terrorism, ASG operatives attacked the western Mindanao town of
Ipil on April 4, 1995, killing 53, wounding 48, and then burning and
looting 17 commercial buildings. In February 1997, ASG operatives
assassinated a Catholic bishop. Between 1991-95, the Abu Sayyaf
Group was responsible for 67 terrorist attacks, more than half of
which were indiscriminant bombings. All led to the death of some
136 people and hundreds of injuries.14
Deepening Ties to al Qaeda (1991-95).
Parallel to their development as a terrorist organization, engaged
in fomenting sectarian conﬂict, the ASG deepened their relationship
with transnational terrorist organizations. Early on, the Abu Sayyaf
was funded through a ﬁnancial network established by Mohammed
4

Key Dates in Evolution of the ASG
April 4, 1991

Grenade attack in Zamboanga City kills two American
evangelists

August 1991

Bombing of Christian missionary ship M/V Doulos

May 20, 1992

Killing of Italian priest Fr. Salvatorre Carzedda in Zamboanga

August 10, 1992

Bombing of building in Zamboanga resulting in 2 deaths and 40
other casualties (from Christian missionary ship)

January 17, 1993

Kidnapping of two Spanish nuns in Sulu

March 18, 1993

Kidnapping of a Spanish priest

November 14, 1993

Kidnapping of an American missionary

December 26, 1993

Bombing of a cathedral in Davao

June 10, 1994

Bombings in Zamboanga kill 71 people

April 4, 1995

Attack on Ipil resulting in 53 deaths, 48 wounded, and the
destruction of 17 commercial buildings

Table 1. ASG Terrorist Targets, 1991-95.
Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law, who was
dispatched to the Philippines in 1991 and established a network of
Islamic charities.15 Khalifa was ofﬁcially the regional director for the
Saudi-based charity, the Islamic International Relief Organization
(IIRO), responsible not just for projects in the Philippines but also
in Indonesia, Thailand, and Taiwan.16 As with most of the Islamic
charities that have been implicated in terrorist ﬁnancing, Khalifa’s
charities did do some good work, albeit for politically motivated
purposes. According to Philippine National Security Advisor Roilo
Golez, Khalifa “built up the good will of the community through
charity and then turned segments of the population into agents.”17 The
IIRO’s charitable activities included the construction of an orphanage
and dispensary in Cotabato City and dispensaries and pharmacies in
Zamboanga. The IIRO funded a ﬂoating clinic to serve Muslims in
remote villages in western Mindanao. It provided food and clothing
to internally displaced people who ﬂed war zones. In addition,
IIRO funding went to schools and scholarships. Khalifa established
Al Maktum University in Zamboanga using funds from the IIRO.
The IIRO asserted that, while it did not always cooperate with the
government on these projects, it at least had ofﬁcial approval.18
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Khalifa does not deny contacts to the Abu Sayyaf or its founder,
Abdurrajak Janjalani. As director of the Muslim World League
(MWL), “Abu Sayyaf [the nom de guerre of Abdurrajak Janjalani]
was one of the people whose acquaintance I made. He was a student
at the Islamic university, and I met him several times. But that does
not mean that I am with him.”19 He took pride in that, during a period
of ﬁghting in the Basilan, the IIRO provided 3 million Pesos, three
times the assistance that the government provided.20
The IIRO was also a key funder of the Markazzo Shabab AlIslamiyah (MSI), one of the MILF’s most important front organizations that was engaged in da’wah and recruitment activities. Based
in Lanao del, many ASG members passed through the Islamic
academy.
Yet, the IIRO quickly caught the interest of the Philippine police
and military intelligence: “The IIRO which claims to be a relief
institution is being utilized by foreign extremists as a pipeline
through which funding for the local extremists are being coursed
through (sic),” a Philippine intelligence report noted.21 An Abu Sayyaf
defector acknowledged that “The IIRO was behind the construction
of mosques, school buildings, and other livelihood projects,” but
only “in areas penetrated, highly inﬂuenced, and controlled by the
rebel group, Abu Sayyaf.”22 For example, in Tawi Tawi, the director
of the IIRO branch ofﬁce was Abdul Asmad, thought to be the Abu
Sayyaf’s intelligence chief before he was killed on June 10, 1994.
Many IIRO projects were located in Campo Muslim, a poor Muslim
community in Cotabato city. This was seen as part of the attempt
to help the MILF and ASG broaden their base of support from the
countryside into urban areas. Scholarships, likewise, were given to
students to become Islamic scholars. One Abu Sayyaf defector said
the IIRO was used by bin Laden and Khalifa to distribute funds for
the purchase of arms and other logistical requirements of the Abu
Sayyaf and MILF: “Only 10 to 30 percent of the foreign funding goes
to the legitimate relief and livelihood projects and the rest goes to
terrorist operations.”23
While the ASG had limited capabilities to perpetrate terrorism,
it played a supporting role in Ramzi Yousef’s Bojinka plan, a plot
to blow up 11 U.S. jetliners simultaneously over the Paciﬁc, and to
kill the Pope.24 Although Yousef conducted a trial of his bomb plot
6

on December 10, 2004, by detonating one of his small nitroglycerine
bombs aboard a Philippines Airlines ﬂight en route from Cebu to
Tokyo, he publicly claimed responsibility on behalf of the Al-Harakat
Al-Islamiyya (AHAI). This was an aggrandizement. Abu Sayyaf
members played important supporting, though not leadership, roles
in the cell. Yousef and his assistant, Wali Khan Amin Shah, were
willing to train them but did not trust them or think them capable
enough to carry out serious terrorist acts, but instead used his own
men, all ﬂown in from the Middle East. Members of the ASG provided
logistical services and assisted Yousef and Wali Khan in exﬁltrating
the country. Philippine National Police (PNP) investigations found
that Abdul Hakim Murad, the third member of the Bojinka cell,
was in regular contact with a top ASG commander, Abu Abdullah
Aziz.25
The Group Degenerates (1995-2001).
With the breakup of the Ramzi Yousef cell, the ASG began a steady
decline. The Yousef-bin Laden connection was the major source of
their funding, and without a steady supply of al Qaeda money, the
group atrophied. Although the U.S. Government designated the
ASG a foreign terrorist organization in October 1997, the group had
all but abandoned terrorism. The ASG declined further following
the death of Abdurrajak Janjalani in a shootout with police on
December 18, 1998, which effectively split the group into factions
which then degenerated into criminal kidnap-for-ransom gangs.
Their commitment to establishing an Islamic state was reduced, and
became secondary at best. Hector Janjalani, Abdurajak’s brother,
was captured by the Philippine government and arrested for
masterminding a string of bombings in Manila in December 2000.26
Despite this public appearance of adherence to the jihad way, the
group was engaged almost completely in perpetrating very highproﬁle kidnappings:
• In March 2000, the ASG kidnapped 55 people, mainly school
children, teachers, and a priest in Basilan;
• In April 2000, it kidnapped 20 foreigners and a Filipino from
a dive resort on the Malaysian island of Sipidan; and,
7

• In May 2001, the ASG kidnapped 30 tourists, including two
Americans, from the Dos Palmas resort on Palawan.
In 2000-01 they were responsible for 16 deaths and 140 hostagetakings, but no acts of political-religious terrorism.27 They were
a well-armed criminal gang, but not an ideologically motivated
political-religious organization. The label “terrorism” was applied
to them by both the U.S. and Philippine governments, but that had
more to do with their brutality than their political agenda.
The demands for US$1 million in ransom per hostage led many
to consider the Abu Sayyaf as nothing more than a criminal menace,
rather than a secessionist insurgency with legitimate grievances.28
As Philippine National Security Advisor Roilo Golez said, “We have
no evidence that Abu Sayyaf has gotten ﬁnancing from bin Laden
recently. Otherwise, they would not have to resort to kidnapping.”29
One Abu Sayyaf defector said that he quit the movement because
“. . . the group lost its original reason for being. The activities were not
for Islam but for personal gratiﬁcation. We abducted people not any
more for the cause of Islam, but for money.”30 As a Filipino Muslim
journalist who had spent a week with the ASG told me, the links
had been cut: “Before they were tied to bin Laden, but now no. They
[ASG] are independent. They get money from kidnappings. They are
an independent cell.”31 He continued, “How they are linked to Osama
bin Laden now is a spiritual link [because of a] shared interpretation
of jihad.” Though the ASG continually has demanded the freedom of
Ramzi Yousef and the blind Egyptian sheikh, Abdulrahman Omar,
links to al Qaeda and international terrorism were at that time
dormant, if not severed.
Estimates of the ASG’s size varied. From the mid 1990s to 2000,
they were estimated to have 600 members. Philippine intelligence
ofﬁcials estimated that the ASG was able to use the ransom payments
from 2000 to expand to roughly 1,000 men, as well as to acquire new
equipment, radios, boats, and guns. The U.S. military estimated at
the time of their intervention that the ASG had 1,200 men,32 though
there was not a lot of evidence to support this number.
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Post-9/11 and the Global War on Terror (2001-03).
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were engaged heavily
in combat operations against the ASG in 2000-01, but these were
hampered by mountainous and jungle terrain, poorly equipped
troops, lack of clear national command and operational level
guidance, and rampant corruption. In one well-reported incident,
ASG members were encircled in a church compound in Lamitan
town on Basilan Island in June 2001. Yet, inexplicably the AFP troops
pulled out of position, allowing the ASG to slip out of the cordon.
A senate investigation implicated not just local commanders, but
senior members of the Department of National Defense.33
Past links to al Qaeda and the kidnapping of Americans,
including two American missionaries held at the time, led the U.S.
Government, on September 24, 2001, to put the Abu Sayyaf Group
on the ﬁrst list of 27 individuals and organizations whose assets
were frozen by the United States because of links to the al Qaeda
network. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s enthusiastic support
of the Bush administration’s global war on terror led to a heightened
degree of military cooperation. The approach to the ASG was cited
as a prime model of how the Bush administration’s National Strategy
to Combat Terrorism would be applied.34 The U.S. military used
the ASG as the impetus to restore ties damaged by the Philippine
government’s closure of the U.S. naval base in Subic Bay in 1991. In
FYs 2002-04, the U.S. Government provided the Philippine military
with US$284.86 million in aid.35
From January to July 2002, some 1,300 U.S. troops, including
160 Special Operations personnel, were in the Philippines engaged
in a joint training operation, Exercise Balikatan.36 On October 2,
2002, the ASG conducted a bombing in Zamboanga, which killed
three people, including a U.S. special forces soldier; this was a joint
operation with two Indonesian members of the Jemaah Islamiyah,
and was supported by a Jordanian resident of the Philippines who
was linked to the Palestinian terrorist group, Hamas. It was overseen
by Khadaffy Janjalani. This attack explicitly targeted U.S. forces and
signaled a shift in the group’s tactics. This was the group’s ﬁrst
bombing since 1994.
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The 2002 Balikatan exercise was, by all counts, successful and
led to the degrading of the ASG. By September 2002, the ASG was
estimated to have had only 200-400 ﬁghters. Since then, the AFP
have continued operations against the Abu Sayyaf, although not at
the feverish pitch as in the ﬁrst half of 2002.
In many ways, the successful operations against the ASG hardened the group’s resolve to return to their roots as a separatist
organization. Counterterror operations resulted in the capture and
death of key leaders, who had directed the organization away from
a Salaﬁst-based notion of global jihad towards the purely criminal
activity of kidnapping, while concerted combat operations against
them since 2000 gave them considerable combat experience.37
AFP-U.S. bilateral training and joint military operations have
continued in the Philippines. A small number of U.S. advisors
continue to train and provide ﬁeld intelligence to their Philippine
counterparts, as well as provide roughly US$86 million annually
in military assistance, but the AFP’s operations against the ASG
have been hampered by the terrain, dilapidated equipment,38 and
endemic corruption.39 For example, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, a top
JI operative who was arrested in January 2002, walked out of his jail
cell in Camp Crame along with a senior ASG operative in July 2003.
Then in April 2004, ASG inmates led an escape of 53 prisoners from
a Basilan jail; 10 remain at large.40
THE REGENERATION OF THE ASG (2003-PRESENT)
In March and April 2003, members of the ASG were implicated,
along with JI and MILF members, in the bombing of the Davao
airport and Sasa Wharf, both in Mindanao, which together killed 48
and wounded 204.41 Since then, the ASG has emerged as the most
potent terrorist force in the Philippines, executing or attempting
a number of terrorist attacks, including the SuperFerry bombing,
which killed more than 100 people.42 On March 4, 2003, two ASG
members were arrested in Manila with a large cache of explosives
that they hoped to put in backpack bombs to be detonated in malls.43
In June 2004, six more ASG members were arrested for possessing
explosives. Philippine intelligence ofﬁcials believe that this cell
was plotting another round of attacks on SuperFerries in July.44
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Philippine intelligence reports stated that the ASG had formed an
urban assassination squad, known as Fisabillilah, in Zamboanga in
March under the direction of Khaddafy Janjalani and two other Abu
Sayyaf and JI members.45 In October 2004, three ASG members were
arrested for plotting to bomb the U.S. Embassy.46 In December 2004,
they bombed a market in General Santos, killing 14 and wounding
70. December 2004 to January 2005 saw three aborted bombings.
Then on February 14, 2005, they executed three near simultaneous
bombings in three separate cities, killing 11 and wounding roughly
136. Following a prison uprising on March 14, 2005, in which 24
ASG members including three detained leaders were killed, the
ASG spokesman vowed to take the war “right to your doorsteps” in
Manila.47 An arrest on March 23 led to the recovery of 18 improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and 10 sacks of chemical precursors in a
safe-house in Manila.48 The suspect admitted that the ASG leadership
was planning a wave of bombings in Manila during Holy Week.49
At the same time, almost all kidnapping incidents by the ASG
have ceased. Since October 2004, there were ﬁve separate kidnapping
incidents by ASG operatives, but all of those ended in executions,
not demands for ransom.50 The trend now seems to be to kill all
suspected intelligence operatives or informers. (See Table 2.)
This change in strategy to bombings, and attacks in Manila in
particular, caught intelligence ofﬁcials by surprise. As one Western
police ofﬁcial based in Manila explained: “ASG never had a presence
or interest in Manila before. So why now?” His hypothesis is that
JI funding to the group resumed, but only on the condition that
the group conducts operations with a larger, geo-political regional
impact.
The government still labels the ASG as “bandits,” which galls
the ASG. As Abu Sulaiman stated, “The irony about the Philippine
government is that . . . they are belittling us, but they are exaggerating
the problem of terrorism in the country and using, as an example,
the likes of the Jemaah Islamiyah, which is based in Indonesia. But
what is in front of them, they do not see.”51
These incidents beg two questions: Why is the ASG getting back
into the terrorism business? And why is it giving up its lucrative
kidnap-for-ransom business? There are two important endogenous
explanations: changes within the ASG and their leadership, as well
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Date

Action

Description

Victim(s)

Location

November 12, 2004

Kidnapping,
followed by
execution

Photojournalist Gene Boyd
Lumawag of MindaNews
executed

1

Jolo, Sulu

November 13, 2004

Kidnapping,
followed by
execution

Philippine journalist Herson
Hinolan, manager and
commentator of Bombo Radiyo
radio station executed.
Authorities suspect ASG
connection to assassination

1

Aklan

November 19, 2004

Abduction

Dr. Alberio Canda abducted
from municipal health ofﬁce,
purportedly to be used to treat
wounded ASG members

1

Parang,
Sulu

December 11, 2004

Execution

Provincial director of Philippine
Coconut Authority shot in head
on way to market. Authorities
believe he was mistaken for
intelligence agent

1

Zamboanga

January 8, 2005

Kidnapping,
followed by
execution

ASG elements abduct, try, execute
3 salesmen. Authorities believe
they were mistaken for military
intelligence agents

3

Siasi, Sulu

Sources: “Reward Offered for Hinolan’s Attacker” MT, November 16, 2004;
“Suspected Abu Sayyaf Gunmen Abduct Doctor in Sulu,” PDI, November 22, 2004;
“Philippine Government Ofﬁcial Dies in Suspected Abu Sayyaf Attack,” Deutsche
Presse-Agenteur, December 12, 2004; Julie Alipala, “Sayaff Men Abduct, Execute 3
Salesmen from Pampanga,” PDI, January 11, 2005.

Table 2. ASG Kidnapping Incidents, October 2004-February 2005.
as a shift in their relationship to the MILF. There is also an exogenous
explanation: the JI has reached out to the ASG and made them their
partner in jihad.
The Emergence of Khadaffy Janjalani.
Following the death of the ASG’s founder, Abdurajak Janjalani,
in 1998, the ASG split up into three distinct factions which became
nothing more than extraordinarily violent bandits and kidnappers.
Much of this, according to Philippine intelligence ofﬁcials, was
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driven by Aldam Tilao (Abu Subaya) and Ghalib Andang, who had
a “domineering personality” and was driven solely by greed.52
Often the only way that organizations can change policy is by
changing their leaders. In the case of the ASG, leadership transition
was involuntary. Abu Subaya was killed in a joint U.S.-Filipino
ambush in June 2002, while Ghalib Andang (aka Commander
Robot) was captured in December 2003. Authority in the loosely knit
group appears to have been consolidated by Khadaffy Janjalani,53
the younger brother of the founder, who seems more intent on
bringing the group back to its religious origins. His brother, Hector
Janjalani, was arrested previously for plotting terrorist acts in Manila.
Khadaffy Janjalani, himself, was trained in Afghanistan. He had been
a computer science student ﬁrst in Marawi and later in Zamboanga
when he was recruited by his brother and sent to Afghanistan. He
was trained at an al Qaeda camp near Mazar e-Sharif in the early
1990s, where he led a group of 20 Moros.
To be sure, Khadaffy Janjalani is no innocent when it comes
to kidnapping. He was implicated in the kidnapping incident on
Palawan Island on May 27, 2000, that led to the capture of 20 people,
and the subsequent beheading of an American hostage. But PNP
debriefs of six ASG members who were captured in October 2002
present a very clear picture that Khadaffy Janjalani was focused
primarily on waging jihad through an urban bombing campaign.
He directed his underlings to reconnoiter targets and acquire bomb
making skills and ingredients, organized training by Middle Eastern
operatives, and ordered bombings in Zamboanga, General Santos,
and elsewhere.54 He organized the December 2002 bombing in
Zamboanga that killed a member of the U.S. Special Forces.
Janjalani is “working very hard to get the ASG back to its roots,”
one Philippine intelligence ofﬁcial said to me. But this was more
for personal reasons: he was “trying to assert his legitimacy based
on the religious authority of his brother.”55 Janjalani seems truly
interested in reasserting the ASG as a legitimate national liberation
front organization, and stated so in a July 2004 radio interview.56
And the ASG has not been implicated in any kidnapping-for-ransom
since the capture of Ghalib Andang. In this apparent shift in doctrine
and tactics, Khadaffy Janjalani has sought to improve ties with the
largest independence movement in the southern Philippines, the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
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MILF Links to the Abu Sayyaf Group.
Competition (1991-99). The MILF has a mixed relationship with
the Abu Sayyaf Group. In 2002, the MILF spokesman condemned the
ASG’s attacks and kidnapping as being completely un-Islamic. “Most
of their activities are against Islam. We do not sanction most of their
activities.”57 There were “unity talks” between the two organizations
in the 1990s, though MILF ofﬁcials say that nothing materialized
due to “differences over ideology and tactics.”58 Interrogations of
captured ASG members reveal a lot of anger that the MILF did not
share much of the resources and funding from the Saudi charity
network established by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa.59 Omar al-Faruq,
a key al Qaeda operative who was dispatched to the region in 199495 by Abu Zubaidah and who was a trainer at the MILF camps, was
responsible for forming a union between the then-small ASG and the
MILF to create “a stronger jihad force,” but was spurned by the ASG,
who did not consider the MILF a “reliable jihad partner.”60 Some
joint training occurred at MILF camps in the early to mid-1990s, but
this seems to have been enforced or facilitated by the presence of al
Qaeda trainers, who also included Al-Mughirah al-Gaza’iri and Abu
al-Abbas al-Khatami.61
For 3 to 4 years in the early 1990s, despite some rivalry and
competition over resources, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa was also able
to forge working ties between the two groups. Khalifa established the
Daw’l Imam Shaﬁ’ie Center (DISC) in 1988-89, funded by the Saudi
IIRO charity which Khalifa also controlled. DISC has a mosque/
madrasa in Marawi where the MILF and ASG sent operatives for
religious training before going on to military training in MILF
camps. The school is believed to have graduated three classes of
militants between 1990 and 1993. The classes, of roughly 50 cadets
each, were divided between MILF and ASG.62 Abdurajak Janjalani
was a graduate of the class of 1992.
The Special Operations Group and Deepening Ties (1999-2005).
Debriefs of captured ASG members reveal a working-level relationship between the MILF’s Special Operations Group (founded in
1999) and the ASG.63 In addition to joint training, the two groups
increasingly were involved in joint operations. This was often
facilitated, not by organizational ties, but by personal ties. For
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example, Patta Edris, a MILF-SOG member, was the cousin of Abdul
Mukmin Edris, who was a top ASG operative and trainer, and one of
Khadaffy Janjalani’s closest lieutenants.64 In another case, two of the
ASG members who were arrested on October 6, 2004, for the 2003
Davao bombings, Abdul Manap Mentang and Mursid Mubpon,
were former MILF members.65 Eid Kabalu, the MILF spokesman, said
that the MILF expelled the two and that they then joined the ASG.66
Mentang, however, claimed he was still a member of the MILF.67
Mentang also asserted that he was a member of a 15-man MILF
class trained by senior JI operative Zulkiﬂi at Camp Hudaibiyah
in 1995.68 How many MILF operatives went through JI’s advance
class in demolition is unknown, but estimates are around 60.69 As
the bombing appears to have been a joint operation between the
MILF-SOG, JI, and the Abu Sayyaf, it is very difﬁcult to know where
to draw the line. Based on the available evidence, the two groups
have maintained a long-standing, yet ad hoc relationship that has
depended on mission, time, personal/family connections, training
experience, available personnel, and funds.
In another case, two of the bombers responsible for the 2005
Valentine’s Day attack in Makati, Abu Khalil Trinidad and Gamal
Baharan, admitted that Khadaffy Janjalani recruited them into the
ASG. In the summer of 2004, they were dispatched to Butig, the seat
of the MILF’s 103rd Base Command,70 where they met with Khadaffy
Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, and were trained in bomb making by
Rohmat (aka Zaki), an Indonesian JI liaison ofﬁcer.71 Baharan stated
that there were two other ASG members who were being trained
there at the same time.72
It also belies evidence provided by U.S. and Philippine military
commanders who believe that there is a working relationship
between the two organizations. During the 2002 Balikitan exercises,
a trilateral agreement was reached, assuring the MILF that joint
U.S.-Philippine patrols in Basilan would not enter MILF-held zones.
U.S. commanders complained that the MILF gave the ASG passive
support, allowing them to use their territory for safe haven. As
Admiral William Fallon, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Paciﬁc
Command, recently stated:
The Government of the Philippines, bolstered by U.S. training and
support, achieved success in 2004 against the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group;
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however, the Jemaah Islamiyah appears to pose a greater threat to U.S.
and allied interests in the region. JI became more active in the Philippines
in 2004 and continued to train with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and
supported ASG and MILF attack operations. While the GOP efforts likely
disrupted attacks, the JI and associated groups have shown resilience and
continue training future Southeast Asian terrorists.73

Why Does the MILF Stand to Gain? While there have been differences between the two groups, the MILF clearly enjoys having the
Abu Sayyaf around. For one thing, it keeps AFP forces spread thin.
The AFP is spread so thin that recent operations in Jolo precluded
operations against the MILF in the Liguasan Marsh area.74
For another thing, it gives the MILF a degree of plausible
deniability when it engages in terrorism. The MILF uses the ASG as
a direct-action proxy. The MILF has pledged peace, is engaged with
the GRP and Malaysians, and has a public image to uphold; using
the ASG as a proxy allows this.75
The two groups have not held formal unity talks, but ample
evidence suggests that cooperation is stepped-up between them.
There is some indication that the MILF sold or transferred some
weapons to the ASG since the Basilan exercise, as ASG ranks have
increased. Philippine intelligence ofﬁcials have told me that they
have seen ASG members using MILF boats in Tawi-Tawi.76
The MILF sees any campaign against the ASG as a convenient
way for the government to target them (MILF). In photos of the
Malaysian International Monitoring Team’s Advance Survey Mission
to the 108th Base Command in Silocon, Zamboanga del Norte, in
May 2004, MILF soldiers are seen showing fresh wounds to the
Malaysian observers. Despite the cease-ﬁre that has held remarkably
well in the rest of Mindanao, stepped-up operations against the
ASG in Zamboanga del Norte either have given the military the
cover to violate the cease-ﬁre and to go after the MILF on the sly,
or indicate the close working relations between the two groups on
the ground. It should be noted that increased AFP operations in the
region have resulted in much of the 108th base command relocating
to the Lanao del Sur coastal region. The commander of the MILF’s
26th unit command, Abu Ashraf Balindong, conﬁrmed the presence
of units of the 108th command under Kummander Aloy al-Ashre,
who is known to have close ties with the ASG, and who, himself, is
involved in kidnapping.77
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The relationship between the MILF and the ASG has deepened in
the past year. First, the MILF is really trying to take advantage of a
fractious and weakened MNLF, dominated by Tausogs, to strengthen
its position in the Sulu archipelago. The MILF has pockets of support
(such as with the Yaccans on Basilan), but have tried to broaden their
base of support beyond Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sarangani, and
Sultan Kudarat. It should be noted that the replacement for Aleem
Abdulaziz Mimbintas as the Vice Chairman for Internal Affairs is
a Tausog from the Zamboanga region.78 This was clearly done to
maintain an ethnic and geographical balance in the leadership. The
MILF would beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from the ASG’s social networks
throughout the archipelago, as they seek to supplant the MNLF as
the dominant political voice and action arm of the Bangsamoro.
To that end, the MILF has reached out to Khadaffy Janjalani.
Reportedly, U.S. signals intercepts have tracked Janjalani from Basilan
to Palimbang in Sultan Kudarat, to the Carmen region of North
Cotabato, and then to Camp Jabal Quba, a subcamp of Camp Bushra
in Butig, which is the headquarters of the 103rd Base Command. He
could not be there without explicit MILF approval, knowledge, or
support. As one senior AFP commander in Maguindanao said to me,
“Of course, he [Khadaffy Janjalani] is close to the MILF. When he
arrived from Jolo, he relied on the MILF. He was adopted by them.
Even the shipment of his group’s weapons was organized by MILF
leaders.”79
The MILF clearly hopes to use the ASG to keep government forces
spread thin and to help build up its network in the Sulu archipelago.
This factor, coupled with Janjalani’s rejection of kidnapping in favor
of national liberation struggle, has led to much closer ties between
the two organizations.80 At the same time, hard-line elements of
the MILF are predisposed ideologically to the ASG and JI, and are
forging active alliance with these groups.
The ASG’s Motivation. The ASG have their own reasons for
forging ties with the MILF. At the most basic level, the MILF offers
what the ASG does not have on its own: money, shelter, training,
infrastructure, control over large areas of land, logistics assistance,
and help with operations. The ASG “owes” the MILF for allowing
them (ASG) to exist, operate, train, recruit, and raise funds in MILF
areas, and the MILF exploits that.81
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As they did in the early-1990s, the MILF want to serve as spoilers
to the peace process. In a recent statement, the ASG’s spokesman,
Abu Solaiman, warned, “To our brothers in the MILF, don’t
waive our nation’s honor, dignity, and right, even in exchange
for the whole world. No amount of development can pay for our
homeland’s illegal and immoral occupation or annexation.”82
Whereas the ASG has forged relationships with the MILF, it is not
clear that they are institutional. Stronger evidence suggests that the
ASG’s relationship is to individual commanders of the MILF, and in
particular to the 106th and 109th Base Commands, under Salamat
Samir, Ustadz Abdulwahid Khalil Tondok, and Ustadz Umberil
Kato, respectively,83 that stretch from the Liguasan Marsh through
to Datu Saudi Ampatuan and Datu Piang (see Figures 1 and 2 for
details). As mentioned above, there is also some relationship to the
commanders of the MILF’s 108th Base Command.
The ASG appears to be forging closer ties with commands that
are less inclined to support the MILF’s senior leadership in the peace
process. It is highly unlikely that all of the MILF will support a peace
agreement that falls signiﬁcantly short of the MILF’s avowed goal
of an independent state. The ASG is looking for potential allies.
As one senior AFP commander said to me, “Khadaffy Janjalani is
consolidating the radicals. He has the money to support the religious
hardliners who will challenge [Ebrahim el Haj] Murad.”84
Tondok, in particular, seems to have cultivated the deepest ties to
JI and ASG. Senior AFP leaders contend that he has given sanctuary
to roughly 30 JI and ASG militants.85 The presence of Isnilon Hapilon
in the region under Tondok’s control, accompanied by Dulmatin,
a senior JI operative who is linked to the Bali bombing, led to the
November air assault by the AFP on Barangay Linantangan, in
Talitay in the Butulan marsh area.86
The JI operative who was in charge of liaison work and training
of the ASG, Rohmat (aka Zaki), was arrested at a military checkpoint
as he was leaving MILF-controlled territory (109th Base Command)
outside of Datu Saudi Ampatuan.87 He asserted that not only was JIASG training being conducted in MILF territory at Camp Jabal Quba
(MILF’s 103rd Base Command) and Mamasaparo town (MILF’s 109th
Base Command), but that the ASG leadership had given members of
the MILF P100,000 ($1,850) to launch terrorist attacks during Easter
week.88 The MILF, unsurprisingly, denied the allegation.89
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Figure 1. MILF Base Commands.
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106th Base Command

109th Base Command

104th Base Command

105th Base Command

Note: The various base commands do not have a demarcated territory. While they
are all headquartered in various towns, the claims often overlap. For example, the
106th (Pikit, North Cotabato), 109th (Talayan, Maguindanao) and 105th (Columbio,
Sultan Kudarat) Base Commands regional jurisdiction all converge on the southern
edge of the Liguasan Marsh. The 104th Base Command (Maitum, Sarangani) also
extends across the mountains into the marsh region.

Figure 2. MILF Base Commands Detail
of the Liguasan Marsh Region.
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EXPLAINING THE TRANSFORMATION:
EXOGENOUS FACTORS
While the reorientation of the ASG has Khadaffy Janjalani
imprimatur, it raises questions of whether exogenous factors are at
work. Has the ASG been “activated” by the JI or al Qaeda? Who
is paying for the materials? Has the JI stepped up training of ASG
members? Have there been ﬁnancial inducements for the ASG
to engage in terrorist acts? Some evidence suggests that these
connections have been rekindled and that JI sees the ASG for the
ﬁrst time as a reliable partner.
Did the Breakup Really Occur?
Some evidence also suggests that ties were never completely
severed. In October 2000, hostages who escaped from their Abu
Sayyaf captors asserted that two Yemenis were in the camp advising
the Abu Sayyaf in September and October.90 One ASG defector stated
that four foreign instructors (three Afghans and a Syrian) were in the
ASG camp in Tugas, on Sulu Island.91 A PNP intelligence report stated
that “In 2001, Asraf Kunting, member of the ASG shurah, was sent
to Malaysia to fetch four al Qaeda operatives who trained the Abu
Sayyaf on explosives.”92 This was partially corroborated by several
ASG suspects detained in October 2002 who revealed that Khadaffy
Janjalani hosted two Middle Eastern operatives in September 2001.
These operatives conducted training for a month before traveling
to Malaysia.93 Abdul Mukmin Edris revealed that two al Qaeda
members, a Yemeni (aka Azzam) and an Arab (aka Sunawa), were
in Basilan in September 2002.
An Indonesian crew member of a tug boat hijacked by Abu
Sayyaf members off Jolo in June 2002 identiﬁed several Yemenis
who attended a meeting with ASG leaders in Patikul, Sulu, on May
3, 2003. They were accompanied, according to his testimony, by Abu
Sophia, the nom de guerre of Ahmad al-Ghozi, the brother of the late
Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, a senior Indonesian JI operative who was
the group’s emissary in the southern Philippines and liaison to the
MILF.
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MILF Resistance to the Emerging JI-ASG Relationship.
Abu Sophia, like his brother, was dispatched to central Mindanao
where he was a JI bomb instructor in MILF camps. He also was
charged with brokering talks between the ASG and MILF. Most of
the resistance at this time came from the MILF leadership, which
saw the ASG as a loose band of nonreligious and nonideological
kidnappers.
Other JI members also were instructed to open channels to the
ASG leadership. Nassir bin Abbas, the captured leader of JI’s Mantiqi
3 region, which includes Mindanao, has admitted that in February
2004, the JI’s acting amir, Abu Rusdan, ordered him to establish
ties with the ASG.94 He in turn ordered his subordinate, Zulkiﬂi,
to establish ties with Khadaffy Janjalani. Zulkiﬂi, an Indonesian JI
member, was a longtime JI trainer in MILF camps in Mindanao (since
1995), who, starting in early 2001, began to offer training to the ASG
at Camp Jabal Quba. At the time, however, the ASG had lost much
of their national liberation fervor and few operatives were trained.95
The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that, “Khadaffy
Janjalani had long wanted to send men for training at Camp
Hudaibiyah but the MILF rejected the idea.”96 In part, this reﬂects
that Khadaffy had little control over anything but his own faction
of the ASG. In 2001, Khadaffy Janjalani approached Zulkiﬂi, then
the head of the JI cell Wakalah Hudaibiyah, and asked him again
to restore joint training. Zulkiﬂi agreed, but also arranged training
for JI operatives in ASG camps in Tawi Tawi and Basilan in return.97
Zulkiﬂi ordered his lieutenant, Rohmat (aka Zaki), an Indonesian JI
member who came to the Philippines in 2000, to be the ofﬁcial gobetween.98
A Triangular Relationship Develops.
As a result of this training, the ASG began to work with JI
operatives and members of the MILF-SOG in the execution of several
terrorist attacks. On April 22, 2002, a joint team bombed the FitMart
Department Store in General Santos City; 15 persons died and 60
were injured.99 On October 2, 2002, ASG operatives working for
Khadaffy Janjalani conducted a bombing in Zamboanga with two
Indonesian members of the Jemaah Islamiyah that killed 3 people,
including a U.S. Special Forces soldier.
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Joint operations increased after that. A string of bombings and
arsons were done in large part with MILF logistical assistance and
ASG operatives. For example, Nassir bin Abbas asserts that Khadaffy
Janjalani provided RP100,000 (roughly US$2,000) to Zulkiﬂi to fund
the February 2003 bombing of the Cotabato airport. A MILF-SOG
operative, Abdul Jabidi (aka Bedz), provided explosives for both the
bombing of the Cotabato airport and the March 4, 2003 bombing of
the FitMart in Tucarong.100
Interdependence.
Institutionally, relations between JI and the ASG deepened.
Following the Zamboanga bombing in October 2002, Zulkiﬂi went
to Zamboanga to liaise with the ASG leadership. The second batch
of JI terrorists graduated from Camp Jabal Quba in Lanao del Sur,
in November 2002. In January 2003, JI appointed a liaison ofﬁcer,
Mustaqim, the head of “Wakalah Hudaibiyah,” to work with the
ASG. The JI operative, Rohmat (aka Zaki), had been a JI trainer at
Camp Hudaibiyah in Camp Abu Bakar in 2000, and then in Camp
Jabal Quba from 2000 through 2002. At the start of 2003, he was
dispatched to the Zamboanga-Basilan region with the ASG. He served
as an instructor for the ASG in Sulu, and held a high-level meeting
with the ASG leadership in July 2003.101 “I’m JI,” Rohmat (Zaki) told
ABS-CBN News. “But I was told to work with Abu Sayyaf, and we
were all together, so my life is now Abu Sayyaf.”102
According to Tauﬁq Riefqi, Zulkiﬂi appointed “Zammy,” a
30-year-old Indonesian JI operative and graduate of the second
class at Camp Jabal Quba, to be the “Wakalah contact of the Abu
Sayyaf Group in Zamboanga City, as well as the liaison contact
with the MILF.”103 Tauﬁq Refqi, himself, “was arrested while in the
process of arranging with a senior Abu Sayyaf cadre the scheduled
training for the ASG at JI’s training camp, Muaskar Jabal Quba.”104
Rohmat (aka Zaki) returned to Camp Jabal Quba where he continued
to instruct ASG and JI members. He admitted that, at the time of his
arrest, there were 23 JI members at Camp Jabal Quba (MILF’s 103rd
Base Command) undergoing bomb training and an additional 10member cell in Mamasaparo town (MILF’s 109th Base Command).
“There were 23 men who have just ﬁnished the course. I heard they
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would be sent back home and others would stay behind to train a
new batch.”105
Close operational ties between the ASG and JI were disclosed,
following a number of arrests in late 2004 to early 2005. Abdul
Manap Mentang and Mursid Mubpon have confessed that when
they received their training in an MILF camp in Butig in mid2004, Rohmat (aka Zaki) was there with Khadaffy Janjalani and
Abu Solaiman.106 On December 14, 2004, Philippine police arrested
three Indonesian JI members, along with a local ASG contact.107
Dulmatin ordered a JI operative in Indonesia, Abdullah Sonata,
who was arrested in conjunction with the September 4 Australian
Embassy bombing, to dispatch additional JI members to Mindanao
for training. Three members, Faiz Saifuddin, and Nasir and Dedy
Rusdiana, were arrested by Philippine authorities. Sonata later
dispatched two additional members, Maulana Musa and Salman,
who were arrested in Tawau Malaysia on June 9, 2005. Two others,
Abu Nida and Ahmad managed to get into the Philippines.108
Leaked but unconﬁrmed Philippine intelligence documents contend
that in 2004 JI gave US$18,500 to the ASG leadership to fund
training.109 It is a reasonable ﬁgure.
More alarming is that signiﬁcant evidence suggests there is
currently a cadre of ﬁrst-generation, al Qaeda-trained JI leaders in
Mindanao.110 (See Table 3.) While the ASG does not control territory
and they are most certainly under the protection of the MILF, the
concurrent presence of ASG leaders reinforces the notion of an
interdependent relationship between the three organizations, in
which money and training are exchanged for protection and base
camps. Clearly the training is continuing apace.111
The ASG is no longer devoid of ideology, and their newly
rediscovered (or imposed) radical interpretation of Islam meshes
with al Qaeda’s. The JI’s need for a regional base area to regroup
and train, alone, has fundamentally altered the ASG’s direction. The
ASG’s more radical position has allayed JI’s suspicion that it is an
unreliable partner.
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Dulmatin

Indonesian national; senior JI operative and top bomb maker;
educated at Al Mukmin; protégé of Dr. Azahari

Umar Patek
aka “Daud”

Indonesian national; senior JI operative; played a leading role in the
October 2002 Bali bombings. According to Nassir bin Abbas, he
trained in Afghanistan. Came to Mindanao ﬁrst in 1995. Took over
from Nassir, who was a trainer in MILF camps from 1995-96. He
reportedly was killed by AFP forces in August 2005.
Indonesian national. Believed to be JI’s top trainer in Mindanao at
present. He replaced Mustaqim who was arrested on June 30, 2004,
in Indonesia.

Usman
(sometimes Osman)
aka Rizal

Indonesian national. Trainer in the Mt. Cararao region.

Ahmad al-Ghozi
(sometimes goes by
Abdulsamad al-Ghozi)

Indonesian national. The brother of Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi. Senior
trainer in the Camp Bushrai, Butig, lanao del Sur to Mt. Cararao
region.

Samudra al Ormatan
aka Marwan

Indonesian national. Was intended target during the bombing of the
JI-ASG safe house on January 27, 2005.

Abdul Rati Talang Hat
aka Bigok
Abdul Rahim Ayob

From Central Java. Senior JI leader. Dual Indonesian-Australian
national. With his brother, former leaders of Mantiqi 4. Were in Java
for a leaders’ meeting on October 15, 2002. Based in Butig, Lanao
del Sur.

Ahmad
Abu Nida
Mawia

A Singaporean member

Zulkiﬂi bin Hir
Asep (Darwin)
Mhmd bin al Faiz

Trainer for the MILF in the Kabacan, North Cotabato region.

Mhmd bin Alzaad

Trainer for the MILF in the Kabacan, North Cotabato region.

Mhmd Yusop

Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Mhmd Adzari

Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Abu Huzayme

Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Abu Nomar

Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Mhmd al-Saad

Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Abu Hamdi

Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Abu Mashood

Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Abu Guiati

Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Sources: Karl B. Kaufman and Johnathan Vicente, “3 Held in Plot to Bomb U.S.
Embassy,” The Manila Times, October 22, 2004; Jaime Laude, “Terror Threat
Remains Despite Capture of Bombers,” PS, March 1, 2005; various interviews.

Table 3. Suspected Indonesian Members of JI at Large in Mindanao.
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Financial Interconnectivity.
Further evidence of renewed ties between the ASG, JI, and al
Qaeda emerged in April to May 2004, with the arrest of two ﬁnanciers,
Khair Malzam Mundus and Jordan Mamso Abdullah. Abdullah was
a currency trader in Cotabato City, believed by Philippine intelligence
ofﬁcials to have transferred US$25,000 from the JI to the ASG and
local JI operatives, which were deposited in several bank accounts
he had established. They also believe that the US$28,000 provided
by senior JI and AQ operative Hambali in 2003 went through him.112
Abdullah was very close to Zulkiﬂi, the senior JI operative.
Mundus was a more important ﬁnancier for the group, described
by Defense Secretary Eduardo Ermita as a “direct intermediary of
al-Qaida funds” channeled to Abu Sayyaf leader Khadaffy Janjalani
to be used in “bombing and terroristic activities.”113 PNP chief
Hermogenes Ebdane said Mundus was a much bigger catch than
Jordan “because he became a direct source of funds for the ASG.”114
Mundus, who was a student in Saudi Arabia from 1996 to 2003,
was able to direct al Qaeda funding for Abu Sayyaf through the Al
Haramain Foundation. “He also negotiated and solicited money in
Saudi Arabia for the Janjalanis,” according to Chief Superintendent
Ismael Rafanan, head of the PNP intelligence group. 115 Mundus
ﬁrst worked with Abdurajak Janjalani, and later worked directly
with Khadaffy Janjalani, who succeeded his slain brother as Abu
Sayyaf leader. Mundus is purported to have raised US$89,000, or
about RP5 million, which he deposited in accounts in the Arraji
Bank in Saudi Arabia and the Arab National Bank, and transferred
to bank accounts in branches of Philippine banks in Zamboanga City
and Cotabato City. About RP2.76 million of the funds went to the
purchase of supplies and equipment for the Abu Sayyaf, including
riﬂes, uniforms, and a speedboat which was used in the kidnappings
at the Dos Palmas resort in May 2001. The remainder was used for
bombings.116
Other ﬁnancial links between the ASG and both JI and al Qaeda
are still being investigated. Baharan, the Valentine’s Day 2005 Makati
bomber, asserted in his interrogation that the money for the three
Valentine’s Day bombings came from an Indonesian courier who
gave the ASG leaders RP1 million.117 Philippine intelligence ofﬁcials
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expressed disgust when Mohammad al-Sughayir, a Saudi Arabian
national suspected of funding JI and the ASG, was released from
custody and deported to Saudi Arabia the following day.118 While
Philippine intelligence ofﬁcials lacked strong evidence against the
Saudi as they were unable to question him, the speed and forcefulness
of the Saudi response raised eyebrows.
THE ABU SAYYAF ORGANIZATION
This monograph is premised on the notion that the loose band
of kidnap-for-ransom gangs has been somewhat consolidated by
Khadaffy Janjalani. It is important not to overestimate either the
degree of his control or the organizational unity of the ASG. It is
a geographically divided organization which operates throughout
the Sulu archipelago (especially in Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi Tawi)
and now across Mindanao (from Sirawai in Zamboanga del Norte
to Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, and Lanao del Sur).
There is little command and control, and communications are
simplistic; for the most part based on mobile phones. There is little
discipline or internal unity.
Strength.
The current size of the ASG is roughly 250-300 hard-core
militants. This is a very amorphous group which relies primarily on
small compartmentalized cells for speciﬁc operations.119 They tend
to recruit young operatives who are given the minimal amount of
training for an operation. They are treated as one-offs, or amateurs,
who most likely will be caught. With increased JI training, their
technical capacity has improved. But JI’s real legacy will be if they
can impose greater discipline on the organization.
Organization.
Philippine analysts and government ofﬁcials usually overemphasized the formal structure of the ASG. Citing Philippine
military documents, Rommel Banlaoi contends that “When Janjalani
formed the ASG, his original vision was to form a highly, organized
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systemic, and disciplined organization of fanatical secessionist
Islamic ﬁghters.”120 To that end, he established the Islamic Executive
Council comprised of 15 religious leaders. “Under the IEC were two
special committees. The ﬁrst committee was the Jamaitul Al-Islamia
Revolutionary Tabligh Group in charge of fund raising and Islamic
education. The second committee was the Al-Misuaratt Khutabah
Committee in charge of agitation and propaganda activities.”121
Finally, there was the armed wing, formally known as the Mujahidden
al-Sharifullah. Likewise, a Philippine Marine Colonel wrote that in
2000-01, the ASG was believed to be comprised of 16 armed units:
Each group, more often than not; operates as separate entities, particularly
centered on its leader. They support and reinforce each other when in
the face of a common enemy during combat, mainly because they share
the same culture, religion, historical roots, status in the society, and
former organization (MNLF). However, when questions or doubts in the
division of the loot or sharing of ransom arise, they come into conﬂict
and revert to their basic motivation of money. Various interests of their
leaders and individual members include personal interests in money,
vendetta against another group, family or individuals, and connections
or relations with politicians.122

Yet these analyses at best reﬂect the goals of the leaders, and not the
actual organization on the ground. Banalaoi is more accurate when
he describes the the organization based on known “groups,” closer to
gangs, in each geographical location. Though using 3-year-old AFP
data, on Basilan he identiﬁes 10 groups, while in Sulu, he identiﬁes
16 groups.123
There is no formal process of ASG recruitment, training, or
indoctrination. Several ﬁrst-generation members were former MNLF
combatants or trained in Afghanistan. Young men, either wanted
criminals or ideologically predisposed youths are recruited, usually
for a single speciﬁc task for which they are given ad hoc training.
The ASG is a protean organization. There is little understanding
about the leadership structure.124 While Banalaoi argues that the
Islamic Executive Council is still intact, little evidence supports this.
Khadaffy Janjalani sits at the top of the organization as much as
anyone does.125 Beneath him are several lieutenants who are with him
in Mindanao. Then there are a handful of other commanders based
on Jolo, Basilan, and Tawi Tawi. Little is known about their personal
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or command relationships. The archipelagic commanders appear to
have little knowledge or role in ASG’s terrorist operations. While
they are not completely breakaway factions, and there is evidence
of limited coordination, Khadaffy Janjalani does not have effective
control over them. The ASG changes shape every day, depending on
arrests. During 2002-03, police arrested 100 suspected ASG members.
It is a very ﬂuid organization.
Khadaffy and Isnilon have roughly 30-40 armed combatants with
them, though they travel in smaller groups. Abu Solaiman is not
known to have armed combatants. The forces in the Sulu archipelago
are larger.
CAUSES FOR CONCERN
While the ASG remains a very small organization, its willingness
to employ terror and develop close working ties to other terrorist
organizations which allow it to leverage its strength are troubling. In
particular, analysts and policymakers should take the threat of the
ASG seriously for three reasons: 1) Improvements in ASG technical
capacity to conduct terrorist attacks; 2) Stated ASG interest in
fomenting sectarian violence, and; 3) Adept ASG penetration of Balik
Islam networks and recruitment of Christian converts to engage in
terrorist acts.
Ratcheting It Up a Notch Or Two.
The technical capacity of the ASG, in terms of bomb making,
has increased dramatically in the past year. As a top Philippine
intelligence ofﬁcial told me, “the ASG’s bomb technology is getting
much more sophisticated.”126 Until recently, the ASG’s bombs were
small, often little more than pipe bombs, or bombs strapped onto the
back of motorcycles.
While they have not put together large truck bombs as JI has
used three times in Indonesia, evidence suggests that the technology
transfer has occurred. Abdul Mukmin Edris had diagrams of car
bombs on him when he was arrested. One ASG member who was
captured in October 2002 revealed that lessons in putting together
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Isnilon Hapilon aka Abu Musb, aka Abu
Tuan, aka Tuan Isnilon, aka the Deputy,
ala Salajudin

Known as Janjalani’s deputy. He has most
recently been based in the SaranganiSultan Kudarat region, and occasionally in
the Butalan Marsh area in Talitay, Maguindanao.

Jainal Antel Sali Jr. aka Abu Solaiman

The self-described spokesman. Recently,
he has been based in MILF camps and
seems to be in charge of liaison activities. He has no ﬁghters directly under his
command, though he has organized terror
cells.

Hajijul aka Alex

Took over from Abdul Mukmin Edris, when
he was killed. Top urban terrorist trainer/
operative.

Borhan Mundus

Liaison ofﬁcer on Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia.

Mohammad Hatta Haipe

Liaison ofﬁcer on Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia

Abu Khalid aka Ashraf Kunting

ASG ﬁnance operative in Manila

Esmin Radullan (sometimes listed as
Ismin Sahiron)

Son of Radullan Sahiron. Reportedly
moved to Mindanao to liaise/join with MILF.

Table 4. Janjalani’s Lieutenants.
Radullan Sahiron aka
Commander Putol

Based on Sulu. The one armed commander has been
described as a very charismatic, but ﬁery, preacher. He
held the Indonesian tug-boat crew. His troops are some of
the ASG’s ﬁercest combatants and in October 2002, they
handed the Philippine marines their heaviest combat losses since the 1970s. At the time he was believed to command around 100 ﬁghters. He has a P1 million bounty. His
son, Esmin Radullan (sometimes listed as Ismin Sahiron),
and other subleaders, Jundam Jamalul aka Black Killer
and Kiri Hamid reportedly went to Mindanao to merge with
the MILF. His two nephews, Muin Maulod Sahiron and
Adbumon Sahiron are his top lieutenants.

Gumbahali Abu Jumdail
aka Dr. Abu

Commander on Jolo. At one time he was thought to have
roughly 300 ﬁghters. He was involved in the April 23,
2000, Sipidan raid.

Mubin Ibba

Commander on Basilan. Was Isnilon Hapilon’s deputy.
Led a mass-breakout from a jail on Basilan in April 2004.
25 ASG members escaped.

Albader Parad

Commander on Jolo

Borhan Mundus
Hadon Adak

Deputy commander on Jolo

Hadji Radi Upao

Commander in Tawi Tawi

Table 5. ASG Commanders in the Sulu Archipelago.
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Tanakalun Lianson

Top commander on Basilan. Killed in January 2005.

Hamsiraji Sali aka Jose Ramirez

Killed in Basilan in April 2004.

Mujib Susukan

Killed in February 2003.

Redendo Cain Dellosa aka Hakid Akmal

Arrested in 2004. Admitted to planting the
bomb on the SuperFerry in February 2004.
Balik Islam convert.

Galib Damon

Arrested on October 21, 2004

Alhamser Manatad Limbong

Arrested on February 27, 2004.

Table 6. Senior ASG Lieutenants/Commanders
Neutralized in 2003-05.
a truck bomb were conducted, and that JI had the capacity to do
so if it wanted.127 Indeed one of the leading bomb makers for JI,
Dulmatin, is reported to be in the southern Philippines. In December
2004, Philippine security agents arrested an Abu Sayyaf member
accompanying three JI members to MILF camps in Mindanao, where
they were to conduct training on car bombings. As the head of
PNP Intelligence, Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafnan, ominously
warned, “They were planning to go into car bombs. They have
reached that level of sophistication. They are ready to do it.”128
The ASG demonstrated with the SuperFerry incident that they
have graduated to a more lethal scope of attacks. The Valentine’s
Day bomb in General Santos City was made from a 105mm howitzer
shell, signiﬁcantly larger than the mortar shell bombs they have
traditionally used. The fact that they were able to execute three
bombings across the country nearly simultaneously displays a degree
of technical sophistication. I would argue that, in this speciﬁc case,
there is no difference between an artillery shell and mortar shell,
except for the size of the bang. Same priming, wiring, and detonation
are used, and were used. Also, simultaneous bombings translate into
an improved degree of operational sophistication, not technical. It
shows they are better at coordinating what they are doing.
In the ASG’s safehouse on 141 Aglipay Street, used as the
Valentine’s Day bomber’s base of operations, police discovered not
just a huge inventory of bomb making equipment and explosives,
but ominously 12 small bombs made of C4 mixed with kerosene
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and reinjected into personal care products (toothpaste tubes and
shampoo bottles). Intelligence ofﬁcials believe that the only purpose
for such small bombs is to blow up airplanes.129
As the ASG is reverting to its terrorist past, they also are harkening
back to the period of tutelage under Ramzi Yousef and taking a page
out of his playbook which is: the potential for more lethal attacks
is clearly evident, and the ASG leaders seem bent on escalating the
level of violence.
The Potential for Sectarian Violence.
The MILF has never turned their war into a sectarian conﬂict.
Indeed, the MILF has worked with Christian communities and
members of the Catholic clergy effectively. Leading ideologues have
contended, “Jihad is not meant to wage indiscriminant ﬁghting
against non-Muslims, mush less Christians.”130 The ASG, in contrast,
was founded on the notion of sectarian violence. For the ﬁrst 5 years
of the organization’s life, its attacks were directed almost exclusively
at Christian targets: bombings and grenade attacks of churches, and
assassinations and kidnappings of clergy and missionaries. There is
growing concern that the ASG will return to these tactics to provoke
the desired conﬂict. Planned and thwarted attacks in metropolitan
areas during Holy Week point to the conscious desire to target nonMuslim religious elements.
The impetus also has come from JI, which always has used
sectarian conﬂict to further their cause and bolster their ranks. This
is what JI and its leaders were consumed with in 1998-2000 when
they established two separate paramilitaries, the Laskar Mujiheddin
and the Laskar Jundullah in the Malukus and Sulawesi, respectively.
This was an important tool for JI in indoctrinating their members,
giving them a sense of defending their religion and reinforcing their
Manichean view of the world. In 2004-05, the number of bombings,
attacks, and assassinations must be seen as a deliberate attempt to
break the uneasy truce that has held since the negotiation of the
Malino Accords in 2002.
• In October 2004, 123 IEDs were discovered in a cache hidden
in a Muslim cemetery outside of Poso.
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• On March 28, 2005, Indonesian police raided safe houses used
by Islamic militants in Ambon, seizing a cache of some 95
IEDs and ammunition.
• On April 24, another sectarian conﬂict ﬂared in Mamasa
Regency in Central Sulawesi. A gang of Muslim “Kommandos”
torched houses in a Christian community, killing six. The ﬁrst
suspect arrested in conjunction with the attacks admitted his
“plans to carry out terror attacks and bombings across the
country.” His arrests were followed by two bombings in April
in Poso.
• On May 2, Indonesian police arrested three suspects wanted
in conjunction with the August 2003 bombing of the J. W.
Marriott Hotel in Jakarta. All three, as well as a fourth who
escaped, were involved in not only the sectarian bloodletting
in Ambon in 1999-2000, but also the April 24 attacks in
Mamasa.
• On May 28, twin bomb blasts at a market in Tentana, Central
Sulawesi, killed 22 people.
At the same time the Laskar Mujiheddin reconstituted themselves
and appeared in Aceh in the wake of the December 26 tsunami.131
Their revival, following the release from jail of their leader and
founder, Mohammad Iqbal Abdurrahman (aka Abu Jibril), should
come as no surprise. Unlike other JI leaders, such as Wan Min Wan
Mat or Nassir bin Abbas, who have been released after renouncing
JI and its violent means,132 Abu Jibril has not.
One Philippine Intelligence ofﬁcial conﬁrmed to me that several
members of the Laskar Jundullah were currently in Mindanao. He
went out of his way to differentiate them from common JI members.133
Other JI members, such as Zulkiﬂi, encouraged their MILF and ASG
contacts to escalate attacks on Christians.
Why would the ASG engage in sectarian conﬂict? What would
they stand to gain? The answer is two-fold. First, they seek to prove
to JI that they are a reliable jihad partner. By following JI’s line on the
issue of sectarian violence, they will deepen the bond. Second, while
the MILF assiduously has not reverted to sectarian violence, they
have also failed in their struggle. Not only has the MILF not won
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an independent homeland, but also the number of Christian settlers
continues to increase. Muslims now comprise a majority in only
ﬁve provinces and two cities in Mindanao, with the ratios declining
rapidly (by Manila design). The ASG might see sectarian conﬂict as a
means to win over disaffected and frustrated members of the MILF.
To that end, the MILF, in a very interesting recent posting on
their website, warned of the ASG’s move towards fomenting “lateral
violence.”134 It is worth recounting the March 22, 2005, statement:
In the same vein, Ameen also hit the Abu Sayyaf, especially its self-styled
spokesman, a certain Abu Sulaiman, for equally promoting MuslimChristian animosity in this country.
“Only the ‘enemy’ will beneﬁt when Muslims and Christians start cutting
each other throat [sic] in this country,” he warned.
He reiterated earlier call [sic] to the Abu Sayyaf to abandon their “terrorist
ways” and return to the correct teachings of Islam that even during war
“non-combatants” are spared from harm, adding that such activities
will only alienate them from the people being one of the most important
factors in a truly revolutionary warfare.
“When you offended (sic) the people,” he warned, “you lose their support
and you’re in great trouble.”135

Unlike other MILF postings on www.luwaran.com, which tend to
respond to events in the news, there was no real news event to prompt
this statement. Clearly the MILF is attuned to the ASG’s avowed
intention, and it is causing some concern among the leadership. The
saving grace is that the ASG’s numbers remain quite small, and it is
not evident to me that they actually have the capability to engage in
such acts. That said, they clearly have demonstrated the will.
While the vast majority of Muslims in the South would not
support a broader sectarian conﬂict as it would eventually bring
a heavy-handed and in certain areas more or less indiscriminate
PNP and AFP response, the ASG is not a mass movement, nor does
it strive to be. It is an elite organization which is trying to follow
what it believes to be the correct path, regardless of current popular
support.
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Balik Islam and Christian Converts.
The third concern for Philippine security ofﬁcials is the degree to
which ASG members have recruited from Balik Islam organizations.136
This has given the ASG and JI a reach into the Luzon-Manila regions,
beyond the Muslim-dominated south. While the MILF has availed
itself of Balik Islam groups to a small degree, the Abu Sayyaf adroitly
has exploited the zeal of new adult converts to Islam. According to
statistics gathered by Luis Q. Lacar in his study of the Balik Islam
phenomenon, by 1995 there were 98,500 converts.137
Abu Sayyaf worked closely with one group of converts, called
the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) in the late 1990s. The RSM was
a cell of militant students and teachers at the Madrasah of Fi Sabilila
Daw’ah and Media Foundation in Luzon Island, which was broken
up in early 2002. Although it was amateurish, it gained the attention
of Philippine police and intelligence ofﬁcials for three reasons.
First, the RSM had clear ties to both the MILF and the ASG.
The group’s leader, Ahmed Islam del Rosario Santos, and his two
brothers traveled to Camp Abu Bakar in August 1999 to meet with
MILF leaders; and in December 2001, Santos underwent military
and explosives training at Camp Bushra at Lanao del Sur. The RSM
received funding from the Darul Hijrah Foundation, which was
founded by several MILF members including Abbas Kansi, Abdul
Nasser Nooh (former MILF liaison ofﬁcer in Manila), Khairoden
Macarya, Abdulla Akmad, and Bashir Hasan, and is under the
unofﬁcial leadership of Yusop Alongan, the former MILF Financial
Committee Chairman. Sheikh Omar Lavilla, another RSM leader and
a former classmate of Janjalani at Mindanao State University, was
promised support from the ASG leader in late-2000.138 A suspected
ASG front in Manila, the Philippine Association of Muslimah Daul
Eemanm Inc., was connected to the RSM and Balik Islam activities.139
But the connections are also based on kinship. Three sisters, all Balik
Islam converts, are the wives of Khadaffy Janjalani (Zainad Lim
Dungon), Abu Solaiman, the ASG “spokesman” (Amina Lim Dungon)
and RSM’s founder Ahmed Santos (Lorraine Lim Dungon).140
Second, it was based in Luzon, the primary Philippine Christian
stronghold and the seat of national political, cultural, and ﬁnancial
power. This indicated that at the very least, there was a large
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disaffected population, so cut off from mainstream Philippine life
that they actually would convert from Chrisianity to Islam, and
at worst, that the southern Muslim rebels wanted to expand the
battleﬁeld physically to relieve some of the pressure the government
was putting on them. For instance, of the 1,890 madrassas in the
Philippines, only 1,000 or so are in Mindanao; the remainder are
spread across the rest of the country.
The third and more urgent cause for alarm was that the RSM was
built upon Mohammed Jamal Khalifa’s NGO network, left unscathed
by the Philippine authorities after 1995. These include the Islamic
Studies Call and Guidance (ISCAG),141 the Islamic Information
Center led by Nedal al-Dhalain,142 and Islamic Wisdom Worldwide
Mission (IWWM). The IWWM is led by Mohammad Amin Soloman
Al Ghafari, a long-time associate of Khalifa, and absorbed the IRIC
staff after it was closed in 1995. The IWWM also has a long history of
providing money for MILF.
More recently, Philippine National Security Adviser Norberto
Gonzales said Abu Sayyaf chieftain Khadaffy Janjalani has deployed
80 Muslim converts mainly to Manila and other key cities to bomb
civilian and government targets.143 To date, there is no known
organizational presence in Manila.
What is most alarming is not just that these charities remain
operating, but the militancy of their converts. Since the regeneration
of the ASG as a bona ﬁde terrorist organization in the start of 2004,
Muslim converts have played key roles in every attack, attempted
attack or operation:
• Redendo Cain Dellosa, aka Hakid Akmal, arrested in 2004,
admitted to planting the bomb on the SuperFerry in February
2004;
• Angelo Abu Khalil Trinidad, aka Abu Khalil, one of the two
Valentine’s Day (Makati) bombers, was arrested on February
22, 2005;
• Allan Burlognatan, shot after escaping from Camp Crame, was
arrested for attempting a bus bombing in Manila in February
2005;144
• Ibrahim Mutu Kessel, a cell member under the leadership
of Abdul Manap Mentang, arrested in November 2004; was
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thought to be the ring-leader of a group of 40 Balik Islam
recruits to the ASG;145
• Jaybe Ofrasio, a Balik Islam convert in Ireland, was arrested
by authorities there for wiring money to ASG and JI suspects;
he provided a safehouse for Tauﬁq Riefqi, an Indonesian
JI operative in Cotabato; Zulkiﬂi, a top JI operative in the
Philippines, was arrested in 2003 as he tried to enter Malaysia
using a passport in the name of Dani Ofrasio;146
• Tyrone Dave Santos, aka Daud Santos or Dawud Muslim del
Rosario Santos, was arrested on March 23, 2005, in Manila
for possession of explosives that were intended for a string
of attacks during Holy Week; he is the brother of the RSM’s
founder Ahmed Islam del Rosario Santos.147
As one senior security ofﬁcial complained to me, they knew that
the ASG was actively using the Balik Islam network to recruit and
indoctrinate new members, but they did not have smoking gun
evidence that the Saudi and Gulf-funded charities that supported
Balik Islam were actively complicit in supporting the militants,
which limited their response.148
IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY
The regeneration of the ASG has implications for both Philippine
security, especially in terms of its impact on the ongoing GRP-MILF
peace process, as well as on regional security.
Implications for the MILF, the Peace Process,
and Philippine Security.
The MILF currently is engaged in peace talks with the Philippine
government.149 The 12,000-man rebel army has been ﬁghting since
1978 for the establishment of its own homeland, governed by Islamic
law. Chairman Ebrahim El Haj Murad has indicated that he is truly
committed to ﬁnding a durable political solution to the civil war.
While the cease-ﬁre is holding well, little has been agreed to in the
talks between the two sides.
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While the GRP asserts that the MILF is a loose coalition and highly
factionalized, I come to a different conclusion. Based on dozens
of interviews with MILF ofﬁcials, their negotiators and advisors, I
contend that the MILF is a more unitary organization than it is given
credit for (though it is hardly monolithic), with effective (though it
can be slow) command and control.150 There are clearly differences
of opinion over certain policies (Jemaah Islamiyah and the ASG,
for example), but there is no overt factionalism that hampers
decisionmaking or threatens the organization as a whole. Chairman
Ebrahim el-Haj Murad is in effective control, for now. Even before
Salamat died, “Murad presided over executive functions”151 so that
there was no question as to who would take over the organization.
Members have told me that the Central Committee decision to
appoint Murad as chairman was unanimous.152
Yet the potential for factionalism is there, especially over a
peace agreement with the government, which, if it is reached,
likely would fall short of full independence or a referendum. An
MNLF-like autonomy agreement, such as that signed between
the GRP and MNLF, which in the MILF’s eyes has been a dismal
failure and did not address the root causes of the insurgency, will
lead to the factionalization of the organization. We know where the
factionalization will come from: the base commands/units loyal
to Samir Hashim, Ustadz Abdulwahid Khalil Tondok, and Ustadz
Ameril Umbra Kato; and a handful of subcommanders, including
Abdul Kitogi Icow. A few other base commanders are “on the border
line.” Alloy al-Ashre of the 108th has been close to ASG members in
the past. These individuals have shown that they are welcoming to
foreign jihadis, willing to use indiscriminant violence, and willing to
escalate the conﬂict. For now, the Central Committee is in control,
and the MILF’s leadership appears to be trying to contain these
hardcore elements, but they will not be able to hold on for much
longer.
Rather than factionalism, the real rifts in the organization seem
to be generational. “The younger set thinks different. They are
radicals in a different way,” Attorney Michael Mastura told me.153
This phenomenon can be explained in two ways. First, a critical mass
has returned from the Middle East that has been socialized in a more
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militant and austere interpretation of Islam. Second, some frustration
exists within the ranks that after 20 years the older generation was
not able to free the Bangsamoro people. The MILF was shocked in
May 2004 when four of its members had admitted that they had
been recruited by JI. Some leaders now describe JI as a “virus”
that is targeting their youth.154 Talking about the MILF revolution,
one leader said to me, “It is not religious fundamentalism. It is
nationalism. We have to stop it now. It could become an issue of
fundamentalism.”155
And this seems to be what is driving the MILF leadership’s
thinking. One MILF negotiator told me that if they signed a peace
agreement that was detrimental to the MILF, then there would be
large scale defections: “The Abu Sayyaf will welcome them with
open arms,” one member told me.156 Chairman Murad warned Time
Magazine about the radicalism of Moro youth and how they will be
drawn toward JI and the ASG if the peace agreement is not reached
soon: “Once they see some hope, then they will think twice before
joining groups that advocate suicide bombing, and so on. But when
they believe there is no future, then they will go to these groups.”157
And perhaps that is part of the Abu Sayyaf’s calculation: if the
MILF makes peace with the government and accepts autonomy
rather than full independence, then more radical leaders of the MILF
will join with the ASG. As one ASG leader stated recently, “If this
sell-out succeeds, more blood will ﬂow because the young are more
determined jihadis. We will soon ﬁnd out there are more Osama bin
Laden’s in our midst.”158
On February 1, 2005, the AFP launched a major attack on Jolo.
The provocation is still disputed: AFP troops say that ASG, with
some local MNLF cadres, ambushed and killed 14 AFP soldiers.
Local Muslims do not deny that an ambush took place, but assert
that it was a local MNLF commander, Ustadz Sadir Malik, and his
troops only, who were responding to an unprovoked attack that led
to the death of a local religious leader, his wife, and child.159 The
AFP insisted the individuals in the targeted house were members
of the ASG. In the ensuing conﬂict, the AFP has now renewed the
war with members of the one group that they had made peace with.
The ASG claims that they are ﬁghting side by side with the MNLF,
something that the MNLF vehemently denies.160 Yet even this small
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and concentrated offensive has depleted the AFP of the resources it
needs to ﬁght elsewhere. As mentioned above, the primary security
threat to the Philippine government remains the CPP/NPA, which
is increasing in both numbers and strength.
In short, the ASG will capitalize if there is a peace agreement
(whether it is meaningful or unimplementable) between the GRP and
the MILF as radical members will defect to their ranks. At the same
time, the ASG also stands to gain if there is no peace agreement, or
if the GRP-MNLF agreement begins to unravel. Should the cease ﬁre
breakdown, as one side seeks to improve its strategic position at the
negotiating table, the MILF will depend more on the ASG to keep
government forces spread thin.161
At present there is so much overlap between the ASG, MILF
and JI that Philippine security ofﬁcials are often truly at a loss as to
which group is responsible for an attack. Delineations are becoming
particularly difﬁcult as the groups increasingly work together.
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY
While JI continues to train its members in MILF camps in the
Lanao del Sur-Maguindanao region, some evidence suggests that JI
members are availing themselves of ASG bases in Tawi-Tawi. These
reports are unconﬁrmed, but if true, they would further indicate that
there are ties between the two groups.
Clearly JI leaders worry that the MILF sees them as expendable.
While some in the MILF see JI as fellow travelers and allies, many
in the MILF leadership see the JI as a liability. At best, they see JI as
their strongest card to be played in the peace talks. To that end, JI has
to hedge its bets and strengthen ties to the ASG.
A true core of hardened JI operatives is now in Mindanao
working with the ASG and some members of the MILF. They offer
unimpeachable terrorist credentials and cachet, a wealth of terrorist
expertise, ideological tutelage, and bomb making skills. Most
signiﬁcantly, they have a neo-Darul Islam orientation, the stated
endstate goal of a pan-Southeast Asian Islamic caliphate necessitating
provoking radical sectarian conﬂict. To that end, I have been told
that Laskar Jundullah operatives are now encamped in the region.
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The ASG has a vast reservoir of recruits and they control pockets
of territory, while JI has the technical expertise that the ASG needs
to escalate the war against Manila and become an effective ﬁghting
force. The implications of this are clear.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The ASG has reemerged as a terrorist element in Southeast Asia.
Though a small group, they are of concern to the United States for three
primary reasons. First, they will continue to target Americans and
U.S. interests. Second, they have shown a propensity for establishing
working ties with transnational terrorist groups like JI and al Qaeda.162
Third, they seek to spoil the MILF-GRP peace process, which is of
great importance to U.S. and regional security, since without access
to MILF sanctuaries, JI will have trouble reconstituting its depleted
ranks. For those reasons, the United States should take the ASG
threat seriously.
Nonetheless, U.S. ofﬁcials must recognize that neither the ASG
nor the MILF pose the largest security threat to the GRP. Indeed, the
ASG is a nuisance, though were it to be able to attack Manila on a
regular and sustained basis, serious economic repercussions would
result. All evidence suggests that these groups will continue to do
this.163 The single greatest threat to the Philippine state continues
to come from the CPP/NPA. This has two important implications:
First, the GRP should be expected to play up the ASG threat when
speaking to a U.S. audience in order to elicit more aid and military
assistance; at the same time they may deny the MILF relationship
with and training of JI.164 Second, the GRP will often engage in
quick half-measures to deal with the ASG and MILF. For example,
though the GRP and the MILF are currently engaged in peace talks,
expectations are slight that the GRP has the capacity or will to actually
implement any ﬁnal agreement, thereby sowing the seeds of the next
insurgency. Disaffected members of the MILF and ASG will lead this
insurgency.
The MILF-GRP peace talks are important and the U.S. Government should support them. With the conclusion of a peace agreement, the MILF will have certain rights, but it will also have
obligations, in particular, policing its autonomous region. Both the
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ASG and JI rely on the MILF as neither control territory or have ready
access to guns, materiel, and money. The majority of the MILF can be
weaned off of their relationship with terrorist groups.
There has been talk of placing the MILF on the U.S. Foreign
Terrorist Organization list as punishment for its continued support
for the ASG and JI.165 While most bureaucratic entities understand
that the MILF is a legitimate entity (certainly their grievances are),
patience is wearing thin. Only the State Department continues to
resist the designation, and even it is divided on the issue.166 The MILF
believe that links between them and JI are at a low enough level that
they have a degree of plausible deniability. What is of signiﬁcant
concern to American and regional intelligence ofﬁcials is not simply
that the training is continuing, but that a cadre of ﬁrst-generation,
Afghan-trained JI members is now based in Mindanao, including
Dulmatin and Umar Patek, two of the Bali bombers. Increasingly,
Mindanao is seen not just as a rear base of operations, but as a
potential center of operations. As Deputy Chief of Mission Joseph
Mussomelli said, “The threat remains, and, frankly, on some ways it
is growing. The number of JI that are there, the links between JI and
MILF factions and ASG may even be increasing.”167
In a trip to Manila in early April, the newly appointed Commander
of U.S. Forces in the Paciﬁc, Admiral William Fallon, raised the issue
of designation,168 causing an outcry from the Philippine government,
including President Arroyo.169 Admiral Fallon’s statement reﬂects
U.S. frustration with both the MILF and the Philippine Government.
Regarding the former, the intelligence is making it hard for anyone
to believe the MILF’s denials. Regarding the latter, the Philippine
government has shown little seriousness or vision regarding the
peace process. President Arroyo has shown little leadership that is
needed if she is to succeed in reaching a deal with the MILF that
will stabilize Mindanao. The Philippine government does not want
the United States to do it, because it will stall the peace process and
potentially lead to a resumption of war;170 something the Philippine
government can ill-afford.
While the MILF publicly scoffs at designation, they should not.
Designation would delegitimize their movement and hurt their
dream of an East-Timor styled United Nations (UN)-sponsored
referendum. Moreover, the UN Security Council will likely follow
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suit, and the MILF has no friends on the Security Council. Moreover,
it will set back the peace process and give hardliners in the Philippine
military the incentive to continue the war.
The recalcitrant wings of the MILF and the ASG must be dealt
with militarily. There is nothing to negotiate with these groups.
They are too willing to use indiscriminate violence in pursuit of their
radical agenda, and they are too willing to form tactical alliances
with transnational terrorist organizations, linking themselves with
the pan-Islamic Salaﬁ Jihadist agenda.
But to deal with the ASG and radical elements of the MILF
militarily is not going to be easy. The AFP does not have the capability
or resources to accomplish this mission. And at some level, they do
not have the integrity: the AFP is so fraught with corruption that
at certain points they have made a mockery out of ﬁghting the war
on terror. While individual Filipino soldiers have demonstrated
remarkable valor in the ﬁeld, too many of their leaders have enriched
themselves at their subordinates’ expense. The AFP has taken well
to U.S. training. Units in the ﬁeld that I have interviewed take great
pride in their U.S. training. It is certainly good for morale. U.S.
training, especially small unit, special operations training, should
continue.
But U.S. policymakers and Pentagon ofﬁcials have to be concerned about falling into a trap: With roughly $80 million in annual
military assistance to Manila and little to show for it, the United
States should both reevaluate the aid program as well as establish
better auditing mechanisms for the equipment provided. Aid in the
current ﬁscal year is purported to have been cut to $31.76 million.171
While the training programs have accorded some results, one gets
the impression that when U.S. advisors are not with their Philippine
trainees, combat operations grind to a halt, and ASG members
mysteriously break through cordons.
Since the debacle in early 2003, when the Pentagon announced
the plans for Balikitan-03, in which U.S. forces would “conduct
or support combat patrols” for an open-ended period,172 and then
had to delay the deployment owing to the political uproar, U.S.
ofﬁcials have been more sensitive to the domestic response in the
Philippines. There is considerable public and congressional concern
in the Philippines that the United States is simply out to reestablish
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permanent bases. These concerns seem misguided at a time when
the Pentagon is actually consolidating bases, but they still exist.173
If U.S. forces continue to be engaged in Mindanao, they should
increase their civil action programs. They are exceptionally
well-received by the local communities, whose information and
intelligence is essential to effective counterinsurgency operations.
Road construction, well building, and medical treatment are a lowcost, high-yield investment.
Finally, we need to further assist the Philippine government in
its ability to monitor and disrupt terrorist ﬁnancing. To that end,
the U.S. Government must also push the Saudi Arabian government
to fulﬁll its pledge to monitor the activities of their charities. Much
of the ASG’s funding and support comes through the charities
established by Mohammad Jamal Khalifa in the early-1990s that
have either remained open to this date, or simply proliferated into
a number of smaller charities.
CONCLUSION
The ASG remains a very loose coalition of groups. I question the
degree of control that Khadaffy Janjalani has over the ASG groups in
Jolo, Basilan, and Tawi Tawi. They have neither the discipline nor the
command and control that the MILF has over their troops. It remains
to be seen whether Khadaffy Janjalani can consolidate his power. It
is also not clear how durable either organization would be with the
capture or neutralization of Janjalani.
But the ASG has emerged as a serious security threat to Philippine
and arguably regional security. They have forged closer relations
with hard-line MILF elements, and have proven themselves to be
a reliable partner for JI. There is a critical mass now of senior JI
operatives, not just young recruits. Many now see Mindanao as a
base of operations, rather than a rear training area.
Any surge in terrorist activities will have a devastating impact
on the Philippine economy, already beset by an ongoing, serious
ﬁscal crisis. The government, which is calling on its line ministries
to accept a 40 percent budget cut this ﬁscal year, can ill afford either
increased security costs or a loss of foreign investment. Already,
there is little foreign direct investment (FDI) because the huge public
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sector debt, which has more than doubled to RP3.36 trillion (US$60.32
billion) since the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997, is not leaving the
government money to invest in infrastructure. The national debt
rose by 13.6 percent to RP3.8 trillion between 2003-04 (78.7 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP), one of the highest ratios in the
developing world). FDI is 19 percent of GDP, and must be increased
to 28 percent, to deal with the country’s surging unemployment that
has increased from 12.2 percent in ﬁrst quarter of 2003 to 13.7 to the
same period in 2004. Of the country’s 36.5 million-man labor force,
more than ﬁve million are unemployed, and countless more are
underemployed.
And yet little meaningful government counterterrorism
movement or action is in the ofﬁng, as it is a very low priority of
the public, and hence a poll-driven president. In March 2005 public
opinion surveys by both the Social Weather Station and Pulse Asia,
the president’s performance approval ratings plummeted. Approval
of her performance fell to 36 percent, while disapproval was up to
48 percent.174 The Pulse Asia study found that her public support fell
from 55 percent in June 2004 to 38 percent in March 2005.175 Public
perception of the country’s direction is plummeting, mainly due
to economic issues: 59 percent of Filipinos believe that the country
will be worse off in 12 months’ time. When asked to list their three
most pressing issues, counterterrorism only garnered support from
6 percent of the respondents, while economic issues dominated
their concerns: controlling prices (45 percent), poverty reduction
(32 percent), national economic recovery (31 percent), low pay (30
percent), and the national deﬁcit (10 percent).176 While peace rated
highly (35 percent), disapproval of the government’s peace initiatives
rose from 28 to 35 percent.177 These numbers do not bode well for
either counterterror efforts or peace initiatives in the Philippines. For
a president concerned with her political standing, most efforts will
be focused on core economic issues, and not the threat of terrorism.
ENDNOTES
1. Karl B. Kaufman and Johnathan Vicente, “3 Held in Plot to Bomb U.S.
Embassy,” The Manila Times, October 22, 2004; Jaime Laude, “AFP: JI Plot to Bomb
U.S. Embassy Foiled,” The Philippine Star, October 22, 2004.

45

2. In a radio statement claiming responsibility, Abu Solaiman, the group’s
spokesman, said, “Our latest operation in GenSan, Davao, and Manila, planned
and executed with precision by the gallant warriors of Islam, is our continuing
response to the government’s atrocities committed against Muslims everywhere.”
Joel Francis Guinto, “Bomb Blasts Rock Davao, General Santos, Makati,” Philippine
Daily Inquirer, February 14, 2005.
3. “Cache of Bomb Chemicals Seized in Manila Warehouse,” Agence France
Presse, May 3, 2005.
4. See http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/aug/13/yehey/top_stories/200408
13top3.html.
5. Marites D. Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in
Mindanao, Quezon City: Ataneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and the
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2000, p. 2.
6. For more on the Islamic International Brigade, see Peter Bergen, Holy War
Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, New York: The Free Press, 2002.
7. The Moro National Liberation Front was founded in 1972 by Nur Misuari.
It was the largest of the Muslim secessionist movements and in its heyday had
considerable state sponsorship from the Libyan and Malaysian governments,
in particular from the governor of Sabah, Tun Mustapha. In 1976 the Libyan
government brokered a peace accord between the GRP and MNLF, but it was
poorly implemented, and ﬁghting quickly resumed. In 1978, a faction led by
Salamat Hashim broke away from Misuari, whom they accused of being too
secular. The offshoot was formally founded as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) in 1984.
8. National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), “Brieﬁng on Al Harakat
al Islamiya (AHAI),” No date given, p. 6.
9. 9/11 Commission Report, New York: WW Norton, 2004, p. 58.
10. Ramzi Yousef and his uncle, the 9/11 mastermind, were not members of
al Qaeda at the time. The 9/11 Commission Report describes them as “. . . rootless
but experienced operatives who--though not necessarily formal members of
someone else’s organization--were traveling around the world and joining in
projects that were supported by or linked to bin Ladin, the Blind Sheikh, or their
associates.” The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 59. For more on Ramzi Yousef and the
Bojinka plot, see Philippines National Police, “After Operations Report,” 1995.
11. Edwin Angeles (aka Yusuf Ibrahim) fought the Soviets in Afghanistan.
Following his return to the Philippines in 1991, he was captured by PNP/AFP
elements, and recruited to serve as a double agent for the government. He was
released and rejoined the ASG, but was killed soon after, most likely by the ASG.
12. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., “Belgium Seeks Arms Deals With Suspected Qaeda
Ties,” New York Times, February 2002, p. 27.
13. NICA, “Brieﬁng on Al Harakat al Islamiya,” no date given, p. 3.

46

14. Ibid.
15. For more on Khalifa’s ﬁnancial network, see Zachary Abuza, Funding
Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah,
NBR Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 5, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research,
December 2003, pp. 26-28.
16. The IIRO actually was established in 1978, but co-opted in 1979 by Saudi
Arabian intelligence in order to serve as a ﬁnancial conduit for Saudi, U.S., and
Gulf-state funding to the Mujiheddin in Afghanistan. Through the 1980s, the IIRO
legitimized itself and grew. It now has more than 30 ofﬁces, and its activities cover
more than 75 countries. In the early 1990s, the IIRO decided to have separate
directors for each of the countries, and Khalifa became the IIRO director for the
Philippines. The IIRO claims to have begun charitable work in the Philippines in
1988, but according to documents registered at the Philippine Securities Exchange
Commission (PSEC), the IIRO was legally incorporated in the Philippines on
September 20, 1991, with ofﬁces in Makati and in several cities in Mindanao,
including Cotabato and Zamboanga. Khalifa was listed as the IIRO’s president
and chairman of the board of trustees. Based on IIRO documents at the PSEC,
Khalifa was one of ﬁve incorporators who signed the documents of registration;
another was Khalifa’s wife, Alice “Jameelah” Yabo. Dr. Adnan Khalil Basha,
“Largest Islamic Relief Organization Maligned,” Letter to the Editor, Philippine
Daily Inquirer, August 2000, p. 18; Christine Herrera, “Gemma Linked to Bin Laden
Group Funding Sayyaf, MILF,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 10, 2000.
17. Mark Lander, “US Advisors May Aid Philippine Anti-Terror Effort,” New
York Times, October 11, 2001, p. B4.
18. Basha, “Largest Islamic Relief Organization Maligned.”
19. “Bin Ladin’s In-Law Responds to New York Times Report on Terrorist
Links,” Al Sharq al-Awsat, London, May 2002, p. 4, in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS)-NES, May 5, 2002, p. 6.
20. Ibid., p. 7.
21. Christine Herrera, “Bin Laden Funds Abu Sayyaf Through Muslim Relief
Group,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 9, 2000.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. For more on Ramzi Yousef and the Bojinka plot, see The 9/11 Commission
Report, p. 147; Philippines National Police, “After Operations Report,” 1995.
25. Philippine National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, NICA, “Brieﬁng on
Al Harakat al Islamiya,” p. 5.
26. “Government Junks Abu Demand to Free Bandit Leader For Americans,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 2001.
27. See U.S. Paciﬁc Command (USPACOM) Fact Sheet, “Abu Sayyaf History,”
March 5, 2002, at http://www.pacom.mil/piupdates/abusayyafhist.shtml.
47

28. For more on the Libyan payment of ransoms, see Seth Maydans, “Libyan
Aid Helps to Free Hostages Held in the Philippines,” The New York Times, October
21, 2001; and Deidre Sheehan, “Buying Trouble,” Far Eastern Economic Review
(FEER), September 2000, p. 7.
29. Carlos Conde, “Muslim Cleric Conﬁrms bin Laden Visit to Mindanao,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer.
30. Cited in Jose Torres Jr., Into the Mountain: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf, Quezon
City: Claretian Publications, 2001, p. 41.
31. Interview with Philippine Information Agency journalist, Cotabato,
January 9, 2002.
32. USPACOM Fact Sheet, “Abu Sayyaf History,” March 5, 2002, at http://www.
pacom.mil/piupdates/abusayyafhist.shtml.
33. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Rebel’s Escape Draws Scrutiny,” Washington Post,
September 1, 2001.
34. See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_
terrorism_strategy.pdf.
35. See http://www.pacom.mil/news/news2004/040727ctphil.shtml.
36. For more on U.S. military operations in the Philippines, see Andrew
Feickert, “U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan,
Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia,” CRS report for Congress, February 4, 2005,
pp. 9-12.
37. The author would like to thank John Dacey for making this point.
38. In 2004, the AFP had 10 functioning helicopters, down from 80 in the
1980s. Of its three C-13 cargo planes, only one was operational, the other two
were cannibalized for spare parts. Andrew Spaeth, “Under the Gun,” Time-Asian
Edition, May 9, 2005.
39. In 2003, an independent commission examining the Oakwood Mutiny
drafted the Feliciano Report on the state of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
found that approximately 30 percent of the procurement budget was embezzled.
Currently Major General Carlos Garcia, the former logistics comptroller, is on trial
for corruption. He allegedly amassed more than $1 million.
40. Marco Garrido, “After Madrid, Manila?” Asia Times, April 24,2004.
41. The special panel created by the government, the Maniwang Commission,
cleared senior MILF leaders of the bombings at the Davao International Airport
and Sasa Wharf. The Maniwang Commission issued its ﬁndings on March 25, 2004.
Government ofﬁcials have linked several JI members, who were trainers at MILF
camps and are now held in custody in Malaysia, to the bombings. “Prosecutor to
MILF on Davao Bombings: Face Trial,” MindaNews, June 1, 2004.
42. Jainal Antel Sali (aka Abu Sulaiman) ﬁrst claimed responsibility for the
SuperFerry 14 bombing, though it was perpetrated by Redondo Cain Dellosa (aka
Arnulfo Alvarado).
48

43. Four other cell members were arrested that month. The four-man cell
claimed it was responsible for the February SuperFerry bombing. They were
captured with 36kg of explosives. One of the four was identiﬁed as al-Hamsed
Manatad Limbong (aka Kosovo), a second cousin of Khadaffy Janajalani, who
was implicated in the 2002 Zamboanga bombing that killed a U.S. servicemen and
in the beheading of an American tourist, Guillermo Sobero, in 2001. The other
three suspects were Redendo Cain Delosa, Abdusaid Lim (aka Abu Khalifa), and
Radsamar Sangkula. Juiet Labog-Javellana, et al., “Metro Bomb Plot Foiled; 4 Abu
Men Nabbed,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 30, 2004.
44. Interview with a Philippine NICA ofﬁcer, Quezon City, September 15, 2004.
Further evidence that the ASG was planning more attacks on ferries came on June
1, when Philippine naval intelligence ofﬁcers arrested Alzhezar Salappudin Jila in
Jolo, Sulu, with a cache of various explosives. “The raid [on Jila] was conducted
based on a report from an informant saying the [Abu Sayyaf Group] will bomb
the fast craft Water Jet of Alleson Shipping Lines, which plies the Zamboanga-Jolo
route,” said a Navy spokesman. Among the items seized from Jila were an 81-mm
riﬂe, 42 pieces of dynamite, a half-gallon of high explosive powder, and assorted
components of improvised explosive devices, along with documents in Arabic
writing and electronic equipment. Jila admitted in his interrogation that his group
was behind four bombings in Sulu Island since December which left four people
dead, and authorities believe that he was also responsible for the 2002 bombing in
Zamboanga in which an American soldier was killed.
45. Simon Elegant, “The Return of the Abu Sayyaf,” Time-Asian Edition, August
30, 2003.
46. Karl B. Kaufman and Johnathan Vicente, “3 Held in Plot to Bomb U.S.
Embassy,” Manila Times, October 2004, p. 22; Jaime Laude, “AFP: JI Plot to Bomb
U.S. Embassy Foiled,” The Philippine Star, Philippine Star, October 2004, p. 22.
47. The three leaders were Nadzmie Sadual (aka Commander Global),
Alhamser Manatad Limbong (aka Commander Kosovo), and Ghalib Andang
(aka Commander Robot). The standoff took place at Camp Bagong Diwa Prison
after the ASG members had weapons smuggled in. Three guards were killed.
“Abu Sayyaf, Very Much Alive, Threaten Retaliation for Bloody Prison Assault,”
Associated Press, AP, March 2005, p. 15.
48. Donna Pazzibugan, “10 Sacks of Explosives Seized,” Philippine Daily
Inquirer, March 24, 2005.
49. Manny Mogato, “Philippine Army Says Finds Bombs for Easter Attacks,”
Reuters, March 23, 2005.
50. “Reward Offered for Hinolan’s Attacker,” The Manila Times Internet Edition,
November 16, 2004; “Suspected Abu Sayyaf Gunmen Abduct Doctor in Sulu,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 22, 2004; “Philippine Government Ofﬁcial
Dies in Suspected Abu Sayyaf Attack,” Deutsche Presse-Agenteur, December 12,
2004; Julie Alipala, “Sayaff Men Abduct, Execute 3 Salesmen from Pampanga,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 11, 2005.
49

51. Cited in Garrido.
52. Interview with a senior Philippine NICA ofﬁcial, Quezon City, June 28,
2004.
53. Khadaffy is roughly 30 years old, the youngest of ﬁve children. Khadaffy
conducted Islamic studies in Marawi City, Mindanao, before traveling to Pakistan
and later an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. He is married to Sherma, his ﬁrst
cousin and the daughter of Ustadz Hussein Manatad, one of the religious directors
of the Tabuk Mosque in Isabela, Basilan.
54. “An Update of the Recent Bombing in Mindanao and Metro Manila,”
November 25, 2002, p. 12.
55. Interview with a Philippines NICA ofﬁcer, San Juan, Manila, July 1, 2004.
56. Elegant.
57. Interview with Eid Kabalu, MILF spokesman, Cotabato, January 9, 2002.
58. Ibid.
59. “An Update of the Recent Bombing in Mindanao and Metro Manila,”
November 25, 2002.
60. Philippine NICA, “Summary of Information: Umar Faruq,” no date
provided.
61. Romesh Ratnesar, “Confessions of an Al Qaida Terrorist,” Time, September
16, 2002; BIN Interrogation Report of Omar al-Faruq, June 2002.
62. Edris was the individual who escaped from Camp Crame, Manila with JI
member Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, who was killed in Pigkawayan, North Cotabato.
International Crisis Group, p. 22.
63. Important founding members of the MILF-SOG include Muchlas Syafullah
Yunos and Basit Usman.
64. “An Update of the Recent Bombing in Mindanao and Metro Manila,”
November 25, 2002.
65. Abdul Manap Mentang said that the MILF members Rahman Camili (aka
Barok) and Rio Manamba (aka Bobot) planted the bombs at the Davao airport and
Sasa wharf respectively. The two were arrested in November 2004.
66. The two, along with Mentang’s girlfriend, Monawara Usop, were the
plotters of the attack on the U.S. Embassy. Marichu Villanueva and Jaime Laude,
“Palace Updates ‘Order of Battle’ Versus Terrorists,” Philippine Star, October 24,
2004; AFP, “Australians Warned of Terrorist Threats in the Philippines,” October
23, 2004.
67. Ben Tesiorna, “2 More Davao Bombers Nabbed in Davao Norte,” Sun-Star,
November 19, 2004.
68. Camp Hudaibiyah was the portion of the MILF base, Camp Abu Bakar es
Siddique, that was given to al Qaeda trainers and their JI students. Some MILF
members were also trained in these classes. This class also included Sammy
50

Abdulghani. Jaime Laude, “AFP: JI Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy Foiled,” Philippine
Star, October 2004, p. 22.
69. Interview with a senior NICA ofﬁcial, Quezon City, March 3, 2005.
70. The 103rd Base Command is under the leadership of Abdulaziz Mimbintas,
the Vice Chairman for Military Affairs of the MILF.
71. Jaime Laude and Christina Mendez, “2 Abu Suspects Tagged in V-Day
Blasts Arrested,” Philippine Star, February 23, 2005; Alcuin Papa and Christian
Esguerra, “2 Bombing Suspects Fall,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 23, 2005.
72. He did not know their names, but their aliases were aka Ian and aka
Khatan.
73. Statement of Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Paciﬁc
Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 8, 2005, at
www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2005/March/Fallon%2003-08-05.pdf.
74. Interview with Major General Raul Reylano, Commander, 6th Infantry
Division, Awang, Maguindanao, March 10, 2005. For more on the sorry state of
the AFP, see Andrew Spaeth, “Under the Gun,” Time-Asian Edition, May 9, 2005.
75. The author would like to thank John Dacey for making this point.
76. Interview with a Philippine NICA ofﬁcer, San Juan, Manila, July 1, 2004.
77. Bantay Ceaseﬁre, p. 23. Operation THUNDERSTORM was launched in
mid-October 2002 after the AFP learned that 600-700 MILF and ASG were massing
in Lanao del Norte. Some 200 were from the Zamboanga peninsula.
78. Interview with Ghazali Jafaar, Vice Chairman for Political Affairs, Sultan
Kudarat, Maguindanao, June 17, 2004.
79. Interview with a senior AFP commander, 6th Infantry Division, Camp
Siongco, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao, September 21, 2004.
80. The Malaysian government has exerted considerable pressure on the MILF
to “expel ASG in their midst.”
81. The author would like to thank John Dacey for making that point.
82. “Abu Sayyaf Warns MILF Against Forging Peace with Gov’t,” Philippine
Daily Inquirer, February 8, 2005.
83. Tondok is reportedly the new head of the 106th Base Command; though
some reports suggest that he replaced Umbra Kato as the 109th Base Commander
who, in turn, replaced Samir as the 106th Base Commander.
84. Interview with Major General Raul Reylano, Commander 6th Infantry
Battalion, Awang, Maguindanao, March 10, 2005.
85. Ibid.
86. Despite AFP claims that Dulmatin was killed, there was neither evidence
to prove that, nor veriﬁcation of his presence. Another JI operative, Rohmat (aka

51

Zaki), who was wounded in the attack stated that Dulmatin was still alive. Isnilon
Hapilon and his dozen or so bodyguards/combatants are believed to be based in
the Mt. Dagadabi area, between the 104th and 105th Base Commands.
87. Manny Mogato, “Philippine Army Says Finds Bombs for Easter Attacks,”
Reuters, March 23, 2005.
88. Ibid.
89. Eid Kabalu, the MILF spokesman, asserted that, “There is a policy statement
from the MILF leadership for all members to turn their backs on other groups . . . .
We are categorically denying that we will stage attacks. We are focused on the
peace talks.” “MILF Denies Terror Plan Anew,” AFP, March 24, 2005.
90. “Separatist Rebels Met Arab Pair, Say Former Captives,” South China
Morning Post, October 15, 2001.
91. Torres, Into the Mountain, p. 34.
92. Philippine National Police, “The Threat of Terrorism and PNP
Countermeasures,” undated, pp. 6-7.
93. “An Update of the Recent Bombing in Mindanao and Metro Manila,”
November 25, 2002.
94. Interrogation of Nassir bin Abbas. Nassir claimed to have trained 540
militants a year until early 1998 at MILF camps.
95. Zulkiﬂi was captured in September 2003 while trying to surreptitiously
enter Malaysia’s Sabah state from the Sulu archipelago in the Philippines. He
was captured with ﬁve other JI members. Though the Malaysian government
announced this arrest, they did not disclose the fact that there were two additional
Middle Eastern operatives with them. One is believed to be an al Qaeda operative
while the other confessed to being a member of the Tabliqh.
96. ICG, p. 22.
97. Interrogation of Nassir bin Abbas.
98. Rohmat was a senior trainer and one of JI’s top liaisons to the ASG in
Mindanao. He was implicated in funding bombings in General Santos (2002),
Zamboanga (2002), Cotabato (2003), Tucurong (2003), Davao (2003), and Parang
(2004). Jim Gomez, “Terror Suspect Details Training, Plots,” AP, March 23, 2005.
99. Three suspects, Bernard Balinao, Romy Ksaim, and Bai Hairan Paglala,
were arrested in Tacurong City on May 6, 2002. The police asserted that they were
“all members of the MNLF and MILF” and that they also were “linked to the . . .
Abu Sayyaf.” See http://www.mindanews.com/2002/05/2nd/nws09abu.html.
100. Abdul Jabidi and another operative, Sammy Abdulghani, were believed
to be very close to a local MILF commander, Abdul Kitogoi Icow.
101. Jeff Antiporda and Anthony Vargas, “Terrorist Trainer Nabbed,” Manila
Times, March 23, 2005; Philippine National Police, “The Threat of Terrorism and
PNP Countermeasures,” undated, p. 7.
52

128.

102. ABS-CBN News, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/topofthehour.aspx?StoryId=

103. Interrogation Report on Tauﬁq Riefqi (aka Zammy) stated he arrived in
the Philippines sometime in April 2000 and is presently an instructor of religion at
Camp Jabal Quba.
104. Philippine National Police, “The Threat of Terrorism and PNP Countermeasures,” undated, p. 7.
105. Jim Gomez, “Terror Suspect Details Training, Plots,” AP, March 23, 2005.
106. Rohmat has conﬁrmed that he was present. Jaime Laude, “AFP: JI Plot to
Bomb U.S. Embassy Foiled,” Philippine Star, October 22, 2004; Jim Gomez, “Terror
Suspect Details Training, Plots,” AP, March 23, 2005; Joel Francis Guinto”Abu
Sayyaf Planned Bombings in metro, Key Cities—JI Member,” Philippine Daily
Inquirer, March 23, 2005.
107. At ﬁrst, Ted Yolanda was described as a Malaysian. The other two
Indonesians were Mohamed Naasir Hamid and Mohamad Yusuf Karin Faiz (aka
Pais). Faiz was a student at Ngruki in Java for 4 years in the early to mid-1990s,
though he did not graduate. In 2001 he attended Ibn Saud University in Saudi
Arabia. The ASG member, a Balik-Islam convert, was Muhair dela Merced. The
group was arrested in Zamboanga, having entered the country through Tawi
Tawi. The group was caught with US$7,000, 10 terrorist manuals, al Qaeda VCDs,
and other materials. The four were on their way to MILF camps in Mindanao to
conduct training. According to head of PNP Intelligence Chief Superintendent
Ismael Rafnan, “They were planning to go into car bombs. They have reached that
level of sophistication. They are ready to do it.” Cited in Joel Francis Guinto, “Car
Bomb Attacks Foiled as JI, Abu Terror Suspects Fall,” Philippine Daily Inquirer,
February 24, 2005.
108. Eva C. Komandjaja, “Police Search for Two JI Members in Philippines,”
The Jakarta Post, August 16, 2005.
109. Jim Gomez, “Terror Suspect Details Training, Plots,” AP, March 23, 2005.
110. I.e., individuals who joined the organization in the mid-1990s, before the
JI began their public campaign of bombings in August 2000.
111. On March 4, 2005, the Philippine daily, Malaya, published the names of
21 Indonesian JI members who had entered the country on January 21, 2005, for
training in MILF camps in Lanao del Sur. The names were leaked to them by an
intelligence ofﬁcial. According to the paper, 26 arrived in two groups, the ﬁrst
on January 21, the second on January 28. They included Anwar Narsid, Sahibon
Gulam, Farhan Jiahod, Zia Autad, Gafor Wadood, Omar Amiril, Farnan Dawalis,
Ishaq Buday, Zainal Mandaya, Hashim Mufri, Watani Azibul, Farouk Rajab,
Burnhan Usungan, Nur Salih, Jazali Mauladie, Hesam Abul Guimadil Mojib, and
Habib Taloot. The paper asserts that the group transited Sabah state, where they
were provided safe quarters by the MILF representative, Ismael Haraiba. They
traveled to Palimbang before transiting to MILF camps in Lanao del Sur. There

53

is no way to validate this list. It is likely drawn from immigration records in
Zamboanga. “26 Indons in Lanao for Terrorist Training,” Malaya, March 4, 2005.
112. Interview with a Senior NICA ofﬁcial, Quezon City, March 3, 2005.
113. “Al-Qaeda Financier for Abu Sayyaf Arrested in Philippines,” Sun-Star,
May 14, 2004.
114. Ibid.
115. Alcuin Papa, “Bin Laden Man in RP Captured,” Philippine Daily Inquirer,
May 15, 2004. There had been a warrant for Mundus’ arrest in connection with
bombing operations carried out by the Abu Sayyaf, in Kidapawan City on October
10, 2002, and the other in General Santos City on July 8, 2001.
116. Ibid.
117. Interview with an Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence
Service(AFP-IS) ofﬁcial, Awang, March 4, 2005.
118. He was arrested on January 17, 2005, in Zamboanga and deported on
January 18. This reportedly was ordered by President Arroyo herself, who was
under pressure from the Saudi Arabian ambassador.
119. For example, of the ﬁve people who have now been arrested in conjunction
with the Valentine’s Day bombing, only Khalil Trinidad was known to the police.
He had been arrested previously and charged with possession of explosives, but
had skipped bail.
120. Rommel Banlaoi, “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in
Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case,” paper presented to The Leadership and
Structure of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia, Kuala Lumpur, April 18-20, 2005,
p. 3.
121. Ibid.
122. Rustico O. Guerrero, “Philippine Terrorism and Insurgency: What to Do
about the Abu Sayyaf,” Master’s Thesis, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff
College, 2002.
123. Banlaoi, “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast
Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case,” p. 5.
124. According to Lieutenant Colonel Guerrero, the ASG’s “central committee
in Basilan, the highest governing body, is under the supervision of Isnilon Hapilon
(aka Tuan Isnilon). It has six functional and one special staff. These are Personnel
and Operations, Urban Demolitionist and Intelligence, Logistics/Supply/Budget,
Finance, Liaison, and Medical. Hector Janjalani heads the special staff.” This
overstates the group’s organization even in its heyday. See “Philippine Terrorism
and Insurgency: What to Do about the Abu Sayyaf.”
125. Despite Malacanang’s call for the AFP and intelligence services to draw
up a new “order of battle” in October 2004, nothing has been completed or publicly
released. Marichu Villanueva and Jaime Laude, “Palace Updates ‘Order of Battle’
Versus Terrorists,” Philippine Star, October 24, 2004.
54

126. Interview with a senior Philippine NICA ofﬁcial, Quezon City, March 3,
2005.
127. “An Update of the Recent Bombing in Mindanao and Metro Manila,”
November 25, 2002.
128. Cited in Joel Francis Guinto, “Car Bomb Attacks Foiled as JI, Abu Terror
Suspects Fall,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 24, 2005.
129. Elegant, “Terror, Visible,” Time - Asia Edition, March 28, 2005.
130. Prof. Moner M. Bajunaid, “The Concept of Jihad,” posted on
www.luwaran.com at http://web.archive.org/web/20010206044447/www.luwaran.com/
concept_of_jihad.htm.
131. For more, see Zachary Abuza, “Out of the Woodwork: Islamist Militants in
Aceh,” February 8, 2005. A brief version of the paper an be found in the Jamestown
Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 2, January 27, 2005, available at http://
www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=411&issue_id=3213&article_
id=2369164.
132. Syed Azhar, “Ex-KMM Member to Start Anew,” The Star, March 25,
2005.
133. Interview with a Philippine NICA ofﬁcer, Cotabato, March 7, 2005. The
Lakar Jundullah’s founder and JI shura member, Agus Dwikarna, is currently
imprisoned in the Philippines. Dwikarna was also a leader of Abu bakar Ba’asyir’s
Mujiheddin Council of Indonesia (MMI), as well as the South Sulawesi branch
ofﬁcer of both the Indonesian charity Kompak and the Saudi Arabian charity,
Al Harramain. For more, see International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder:
Jihad in Central Sulawesi, February 3, 2004; Zachary Abuza, Funding Terrorism in
Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, NBR Analysis,
Vol. 14, No. 5, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, December 2003, p.
28-34.
134. See https://www.luwaran.com/modules.php?name=News&ﬁle=article&sid=341.
135. Ibid.
136. “Balik,” literally “return.” Islamic groups refer to the Muslim concept that
all people are born Muslim; and that in their life they might stray, i.e., join another
religion. Balik Islam groups are simply missionary organizations. Balik Islam
organizations in the Philippines began in Mindanao, especially with hill tribes,
but have since spread to Luzon and Manila. Muslim press organs claim that there
have been 1 million converts. There are now nearly 10 million Muslims, about
7-8 percent of the total population, making Islam the fastest growing religion in
the Philippines. Though many individuals converted while working as overseas
Filipino Workers (OFWs) in the Middle East, Balik Islam networks have been
proliferating.
137. Luis Q. Lacar, “Balik Islam: Christian Converts to Islam in the Philippines,
c. 1970-98,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2001, pp.
39-60, esp. n4, 57.
55

138. Interview with a PNP-IS ofﬁcial, Makati, June 27, 2002.
139. Banlaoi, “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast
Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case,” p. 9.
140. Ibid.
141. Since February 2, 1998, Humoud Mohammad Abdulaziz al-Lahim
was also the IIRO’s director. ISCAG was established in the mid-1990s in Saudi
Arabia by a group of primarily Balik Islam converts who were working in the
Kingdom. The movement grew considerably when the founders returned home.
It established a headquarters in Dasmarinas, Cavite; a 1.6 hectare compound with
an elementary school, medical clinic and apartment block. The project was funded
in part by Saudi donations and from the Islamic Development Bank. ISCAG is
currently headed by Nooh Caparino. It is engaged in both propagation (da’wah)
for Balik Islam converts as well as Muslim “backsliders.” ISCAG buys blocks of
time on local radio stations for its da’wah programming, as well as making prison
and house visits. ISCAG claims to have won back some 1,387 reverts between
January 2000 to June 2003. The organization clearly maintains its ties to Saudi
Arabia. ISCAG’s annual budget is approximately P12 million ($240,000), though
that does not include funding for schools, hospitals, or mosques. ISCAG has
funded the construction of six mosques around the country; at a cost of roughly P4
million each ($80,000). ISCAG also pays for the education of the children of many
MILF leaders. Al-Lahim was forced out of the Philippines on April 7, 2002, due to
allegations of sponsoring terrorism, and is currently based in Saudi Arabia, where
he continues to fundraise for ISCAG. For more see, Marites Dañguilan Vitug,
“The New Believers,” Newsbreak, May 27, 2002; Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism, “Troubled Return of the Faithful,” imagazine, on line, Vol. IX, No. 2,
April-June 2003; Johnna Villaviray, “Muslims Identify With ‘Terrorist’ Ideals,”
Manila Times, November 19 2003; and ISCAG’s website, http://www.islamicﬁnder.
org/surf.php?ht=http://www.angislam.org.
142. The Islamic Information Center (IIC) was led by a Jordanian citizen
Nedal Falah Awwad al-Dhalain who ﬁrst came to the Philippines in July 1995.
Based in Makati, the IIC is another da’wah group that purports to be a library
and resource center that receives “ﬁnancial and moral support” from “generous
brothers.” The organization, like ISCAG, divides its operations between Balik
Islam efforts and activities geared toward fellow Muslims. They engage in prison
visits and distribute massive amounts of literature. For example, in 2000 alone,
they “printed 90,000 books and pamphlets, and distributed 4,570 pieces of Islamic
literature, 307 copies of the Koran in English, and thousands of cassette tapes in
lecture form.” There was considerable overlap in membership with Fi Sibilillah.
Al-Dhalain was forced out of the country on October 27, 2001, on suspicion of
supporting terrorism. The ICC remains open; their website is www.angislam.org.
143. See http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/aug/13/yehey/top_stories/20040
813top3.html.
144. Anthony Vargas, “SuperFerry Bomb Suspect Tipped PNP About Attacks,”
Manila Times, February 17, 2005.
56

145. Anthony Vargas, “PNP Hunting 40 Balik Islam with Abu Sayyaf Ties,”
Manila Times, December 24, 2004.
146. This was the name of Jaybe Ofrasio’s brother. Kymina Lyall, “Filipino
Held in Belfast Wanted for Helping JI,” The Australian, February 6, 2004.
147. Donna Pazzibugan, “10 Sacks of Explosives Seized,” Philippine Daily
Inquirer, March 24 2005.
148. Interview with a Philippine NICA ofﬁcer, Quezon City, September 15,
2004.
149. For more on this, see Benny Bacani, “The Mindanao Peace Talks: Another
Opportunity to Resolve the Moro Conﬂict in the Philippines,” U.S. Institute of Peace
Special Report 131, January 2005, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr131.html.
150. See, Zachary Abuza, “The MILF at 20,” unpublished paper, October
2004.
151. Interview with Aboud Syed Lingga, Cotabato, January 2004.
152. See excerpted minutes from the July 30-31 meeting of the Central
Committee.
153. Interview with Atty. Michael Mastura, Cotabato, January 7, 2004.
154. Interview with a member of the MILF-CCCH-Secretariat, Cotabato,
January 12, 2004.
155. Interview with a MILF political ofﬁcer, Cotabato, January 16, 2004.
156. Interview with a member of the MILF-CCCH-Secretariat, Cotabato.
157 Elegant.
158. Cited in Ibid.
159. Carlos Conde, “Violence in the Philippines Tangles Terrorism Fight,”
International Herald Tribune, February 15, 2005; Anthony Spaeth, “Southern
Exposure,” Time-Asian Edition, February 21, 2005.
160. “Abu Sayyaf Is Not in Sulu Clashes, MNLF Says,” Luwaran.com, February
14, 2005, at http://www.luwaran.com/modules.php?name=News&ﬁle=article&sid=295.
161. Already 65-75 percent of Philippine ground troops are based in Mindanao
and the Sulu archipelago. Yet resources are scarce enough that major offensives in
one area often preclude concurrent offensives in other regions.
162. In March 2005, for example, Philippine authorities arrested a Palestinian
national for allegedly training ASG members. See Joel Francis Guinto, “Palestinian
Held in RP over Links with Abu Sayyaf,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 31, 2005;
“Suspected Palestinian Terror Trainer Arrested in Zambo,” AP, March 31, 2005.
163. “Cache of Bomb Chemical Seized in Manila Warehouse,” AFP, May 3,
2005.
164. Ma. Theresa Torres, “MILF Not A Terror Group, Says GMA,” Manila Times,

57

April 2, 2005; “RP Rejects U.S. Warning on ‘New Afghanistan’ Tag on Mindanao,”
AFP, April 11, 2005.
165. Jim Gomez, “Philippines Asks U.S. to Keep Group Off Terror List,” AP,
March 30, 2005.
166. See, for example, the comments of Joseph Mussomelli in “Mindanao
Could Be Next Afghanistan: U.S. Diplomat,” AFP, April 11, 2005.
167. Ibid. The expected Philippine rejection of Mussomeli’s comments can
be found in “RP Rejects U.S. Warning on ‘New Afghanistan’ Tag on Mindanao,”
AFP, April 11, 2005.
168. “US: MILF Tied To 2 Al-Qaeda Outﬁts,” AFP, April 1, 2005.
169. Ma. Theresa Torres, “MILF Not A Terror Group, Says GMA,” Manila
Times, April 2, 2005.
170. “Mindanao Could Be Next Afghanistan: U.S. Diplomat,” AFP, April 11,
2005.
171. “US to Back GMA in Fight Versus MILF Renegades,” The Philippine Star,
January 25, 2005.
172. Eric Schmidt, “U.S. Combat Force of 1,700 is Headed to the Philippines,”
New York Times, February 22, 2003.
173. For example, the Mindanao People’s Causus statement, in which they
warned “Various U.S. ofﬁcials have been harping on this point--MILF ties with
foreign terrorist groups--since last month. It seems that there is ground laying,
testing the waters, getting the public pulse, for greater U.S. interventions in the
military sphere.” See MindaNews, April 12, 2005, for the full statement, http://
www.mindanews.com/2005/04/11vcs-mpc.html.
174. Social Weather Survey, “Ratings of High Ofﬁcials Tumble: Net Satisfaction
with GMA Falls to –12,” March 30, 2005, at http://www.sws.org.ph/.
175. Pulse Asia, “Media Release on Quality of Life, Urgent Concerns and
PGMA Performance,” March 30, 2005, p. 2.
176. Ibid., p. 4.
177. Ibid., p. 6.

58

